Type of publication: Report
Date of publication: December 2025
Site of the organization: ISS
Authors: Taiwo Adebayo, Célestin Delanga and Remadji Hoinathy
Published in December 2025 by the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), this report offers an in-depth analysis of the Lakurawa group, whose violent activities span Nigeria, Niger, and Benin. It is based on a rigorous field methodology involving interviews conducted between 2024 and 2025 with community members, defectors, women who have escaped Boko Haram cells, and security sources in Abuja, Sokoto, Lagos, and Niamey. This document thus provides useful insights for better understanding a security dynamic that remains poorly documented in the region. Lakurawa is a hybrid cross-border group that combines jihadism with organized crime. The group exploits religion to justify its abuses and engages in a range of illegal activities, such as cattle rustling, crop looting, and sabotage of oil and gas infrastructure. This report is therefore geographically relevant to all of West Africa. Lakurawa is not an isolated Nigerian phenomenon. Born from the merger of Malian fighters, Nigerien militias, and local Nigerians, the group now operates on three countries simultaneously and, as of August 2025, has become a tri-border threat extending as far as the Alibori department in Benin. This document provides an analysis of the modus operandi of this group, which carries out armed raids focused on cattle rustling in the states of Sokoto and Kebbi. The text highlights the central importance of livestock in the group’s cultural identity, while emphasizing that this issue is also strategic, as it contributes to the group’s financing and operational survival. It also reports that these seizures are often justified by the group in the name of zakat, despite local resistance that can lead to attacks. More fundamentally, the report demonstrates that Lakurawa is the result of a set of structural vulnerabilities shared by most states in the region, including governance gaps in rural border areas, inter-communal competition over natural resources exacerbated by climate change, and diplomatic rifts that paralyze regional security cooperation. Furthermore, by exploiting local structural deficits and positioning itself as a protective authority, Lakurawa eventually takes control of these areas, appointing imams, collecting taxes, and enforcing a dress code. In reality, the group exercises a parallel sovereignty that the state has failed to maintain. What Lakurawa reveals in northwestern Nigeria, other areas within the ECOWAS region are currently experiencing or are at risk of experiencing. Finally, this report stands out for its ability to identify a new phenomenon that traditional analytical frameworks struggle to grasp: that of an armed actor who is both a jihadist and a criminal, deliberately blurring the lines between religious ideology and economic exploitation. This hybridity is not incidental; it lies at the heart of Lakurawa’s strategy, enabling it to establish a lasting foothold in vulnerable communities while evading purely military responses. By offering a multidimensional analysis of the phenomenon and concrete recommendations for governments, militaries, and local communities, the report provides a tool for reflection and advocacy that is directly actionable for peace and security actors in West Africa. Pourquoi avons-nous choisi ce document ? Publié en décembre 2025 par l’Institut d’Études de Sécurité (ISS), ce rapport propose une analyse approfondie du groupe Lakurawa, dont les activités violentes s’étendent au Nigeria, au Niger et au Bénin. Il s’appuie sur une méthodologie de terrain rigoureuse à travers des entretiens conduits entre 2024 et 2025 auprès de membres de communautés, de transfuges, de femmes échappées de cellules Boko Haram, et de sources sécuritaires à Abuja, Sokoto, Lagos et Niamey. Ce document offre ainsi des éléments utiles pour mieux comprendre une dynamique sécuritaire encore peu documentée dans la région. Lakuraza est un groupe transfrontalier hybride mêlant djihadisme et crime organisé. Le groupe instrumentalise la religion pour justifier ses exactions, et multiplie des activités illégales telles que le vol de bétail, le pillage des récoltes et le sabotage des hydrocarbures. Ce rapport présente ainsi une pertinence géographique pour l’ensemble de l’Afrique de l’Ouest. Lakurawa n’est pas un phénomène nigérian isolé. Il est né de la fusion de combattants maliens, de milices nigériennes et de locaux nigérians, le groupe opère désormais sur trois pays simultanément et est devenu, en août 2025, une menace tri-frontalière s’étendant jusqu’au département d’Alibori au Bénin. Ce document nous présente une lecture de modes opératoires de ce groupe, notamment à travers des raids armés centrés sur le vol de bétail dans les États de Sokoto et de Kebbi. Le texte met en évidence l’importance centrale du bétail dans l’identité culturelle du groupe, tout en soulignant que cet enjeu est également stratégique, puisqu’il contribue à son financement et à sa survie opérationnelle. Il rapporte également que ces prélèvements sont souvent justifiés par le groupe au nom de la zakat, malgré les résistances locales qui peuvent entraîner des attaques. Plus fondamentalement, le rapport démontre que Lakurawa est la résultante d’un ensemble de vulnérabilités structurelles partagées par la majorité des États de la région, notamment les vides de gouvernance dans les zones rurales frontalières, compétition intercommunautaire sur les ressources naturelles aggravée par le changement climatique, et fractures diplomatiques qui paralysent la coopération sécuritaire régionale. Par ailleurs, en exploitant les déficits structurels des localités, et en s’érigeant en organe protecteur, Lakurawa finit par prendre le contrôle de ces zones, nommant ainsi des imams, percevant des taxes, imposant un code vestimentaire. En réalité, le groupe exerce une souveraineté parallèle que l’État n’a pas su maintenir. Ce que révèle Lakurawa au nord-ouest du Nigeria, d’autres zones de l’espace CEDEAO sont en train de le vivre ou risquent de le vivre. Enfin, ce rapport se distingue par sa capacité à nommer un phénomène nouveau que les cadres d’analyse classique peinent à saisir : celui d’un acteur armé à la fois jihadiste et criminel, qui brouille délibérément les frontières entre idéologie religieuse et prédation économique. Cette hybridité n’est pas accessoire, elle est au cœur de la stratégie de Lakurawa, lui permettant de s’ancrer durablement dans des communautés vulnérables tout en échappant aux réponses purement militaires. En proposant une lecture multidimensionnelle du phénomène et des recommandations concrètes à destination des gouvernements, des armées et des communautés locales, le rapport offre un outil de réflexion et de plaidoyer directement actionnable pour les acteurs de la paix et de la sécurité en Afrique de l’Ouest.Why do we choose this document?
The emergence and expansion of Lakurawa clearly demonstrate that violent extremism thrives where the state is absent and where people are left to fend for themselves. The countries of the WATHI region must draw a fundamental lesson from this case. In reality, lasting security is not built solely through military force, but through the effective presence of the state in the most marginalized rural and border areas. Investing in basic social services—particularly water, health, and education—in remote areas is as much a security imperative as it is a duty of governance. Lakurawa is a cross-border threat that cannot be addressed by a single state acting in isolation. Originating in Mali, established in Niger, active in Nigeria, and now present in Benin, the group thrives precisely because borders are porous and security cooperation between states has been paralyzed by diplomatic tensions. The countries of the WATHI zone must institutionalize mechanisms for intelligence sharing, joint patrols, and coordinated cross-border operations, separate from the bilateral political agendas that have so far prevented any coherent response. Also, it is necessary to establish partnerships with communities to set up early warning and secure reporting systems, while strengthening coordination between air and ground forces to ensure a rapid and effective response to threats. It is important to integrate civilian information and perspectives into operational planning to reduce harm to civilian populations and avoid alienating communities. Furthermore, cross-border transhumance routes, which Lakurawa uses as logistics and arms supply routes, must be subject to enhanced surveillance and traceability systems shared among neighboring states. The creation of subregional funding mechanisms dedicated to border security and the prevention of extremism is a priority that countries in the region can no longer delay. Experience shows that a context-specific strategy—one that is multi-stakeholder, multi-level, and multidimensional—is the only truly viable way to address violent extremism in the long term. The fight against these dynamics cannot rely solely on military action; it must also incorporate cross-border cooperation, community-centered development, and the mobilization of religious leaders and local influencers to promote an Islam grounded in tolerance, respect for established authorities, moderation, and the rejection of criminality. This comprehensive approach appears essential to sustainably weaken armed networks and prevent them from taking root in the affected territories. Quelles leçons pour les pays de la zone WATHI ? L’émergence et l’expansion de Lakurawa illustrent avec acuité que l’extrémisme violent prospère là où l’État est absent et où les populations sont livrées à elles-mêmes. Les pays de la zone WATHI doivent tirer de ce cas une leçon fondamentale. En réalité, la sécurité durable ne se construit pas uniquement par les armes, mais par la présence effective de l’État dans les zones rurales et frontalières les plus marginalisées. Investir dans les services sociaux de base, notamment l’eau, la santé et l’éducation, dans des territoires reculés est un impératif sécuritaire autant qu’un devoir de gouvernance. Lakurawa est une menace transfrontalière qui ne peut pas être traitée par un seul État de manière isolée. Né au Mali, structuré au Niger, actif au Nigeria et désormais présent au Bénin, le groupe prospère précisément parce que les frontières sont poreuses et que la coopération sécuritaire entre États a été paralysée par des tensions diplomatiques. Les pays de la zone WATHI doivent impérativement institutionnaliser des mécanismes de partage de renseignements, de patrouilles mixtes et d’opérations coordonnées transfrontalières, découplés des agendas politiques bilatéraux qui ont jusqu’ici empêché toute réponse cohérente. En outre, il faut établir des partenariats avec les communautés afin de mettre en place des systèmes d’alerte précoce et de signalement sécurisé, tout en renforçant la coordination entre les forces aériennes et terrestres pour assurer une réponse rapide et efficace aux menaces. Il est important d’intégrer les informations et perceptions des populations civiles dans la planification opérationnelle afin de réduire les dommages causés aux populations civiles et d’éviter d’aliéner les communautés. Par ailleurs, les routes de transhumance transfrontalières, utilisées par Lakurawa comme autoroutes logistiques et d’approvisionnement en armes, doivent faire l’objet d’une surveillance renforcée et de systèmes de traçabilité partagés entre États voisins. La création de mécanismes de financement sous-régionaux dédiés à la sécurité des zones frontalières et à la prévention de l’extrémisme représente une priorité que les pays de la région ne peuvent plus différer. L’expérience montre qu’une stratégie adaptée au contexte, à la fois multi-acteurs, multi-échelles et multidimensionnelle, constitue la seule voie réellement viable pour faire face durablement à l’extrémisme violent. La lutte contre ces dynamiques ne peut reposer uniquement sur l’action militaire ; elle doit également intégrer la coopération transfrontalière, le développement centré sur les communautés ainsi que la mobilisation des leaders religieux et des influenceurs locaux afin de promouvoir un islam fondé sur la tolérance, le respect des autorités constituées, la modération et le rejet de la criminalité. Cette approche globale apparaît essentielle pour affaiblir durablement les réseaux armés et empêcher leur enracinement dans les territoires concernés.What lessons for the countries of the WATHI Zone?
Extracts from pages/ Les extraits proviennent des pages: 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13
Origin and emergence of Lakurawa
The socio-political and economic context of northern Nigeria, particularly Sokoto State and Kebbi State, provides fertile ground for armed groups like Lakurawa. The same applies to the neighbouring regions of Dosso and Tahoua in Niger and Alibori, north-east Benin. These regions suffer from chronic underdevelopment, climate change impacts and worsening insecurity. In such settings, where state presence is minimal, particularly in rural areas, non-state armed groups fill the void, organising the system of justice and local economy, including the control of mines and extraction of illegal taxes. In this context, Malian jihadist elements, Nigerien self-defence militias and Nigerian locals, came together to form Lakurawa, which later evolved into a more cohesive armed threat.
According to the defector, forces in Mali overpowered some members who stayed behind, prompting them to join the ISSP and possibly fuelling speculation that Lakurawa aligns with the Islamic State (IS). In Niger, July 2025, interviews indicated Lakurawa’s founders came from Mali, likely Tuareg and Arab, merging with Nigerien Fulani and Zabarmawa self-defence militias. Nigerian security sources also noted that ‘inter-factional’ jihadi clashes between JNIM and ISGS caused the Malian contingent to move to the Nigeria–Niger border area, where they merged with and dominated the Nigerien faction. The local communities, familiar with the Nigerien faction, started referring to them all as Lakurawa. The name comes from the Hausa adaptation of the French les recrues (the recruits), evolving into Lakurawa.
Taking advantage of weak state presence and shortcomings in security governance
As banditry started spreading from Zamfara to Sokoto, Nigerian security forces remained stretched on multiple internal and cross-border conflict fronts. According to a review of media reports dating back to 2018 and an account of a local informant, the only part of Sokoto that received some military attention against banditry was the Eastern Senatorial District, which borders Zamfara.
However, the Sokoto North Senatorial District, which includes Tangaza and Gudu, where Lakurawa was then emerging, was without similar attention. An informant, now in Gusau, said: ‘While the government’s attention was on our side, the eastern part of the state, especially Sabon Birni and Isa, with more than 17 bandit groups, the north did not receive attention, which helped Lakurawa move and grow fearlessly.
According to a local informant from Tangaza, Lakurawa confronted and overpowered the bandits, notably the Kachalla Charanbe group in Bauni Forest, Tangaza. Apparently, on account of the group’s success against the Charanbe group, Gudu and Tangaza community stakeholders – including the district chiefs of Balle and Gongono, with support from the Nigerian Cattle Breeders Association or ‘Miyetti Allah’ – invited Lakurawa to help combat other banditry threats. Thanks to their effectiveness in repelling bandits, Lakurawa earned legitimacy among the locals, who had directly sought the group’s help for protection. The source from Tangaza said: ‘That was all while the government was not present and had failed to protect the people.’
This illustrated a worrying pattern of normalising security outsourcing to non-state actors. This dynamic is not unique to the Lakurawa case or Nigeria. Across the Sahel, similar groups have emerged as ‘protectors’ in contexts where state capacity is weak or absent. In Nigeria’s Kaduna State, a Boko Haram splinter group, Ansarul Muslimina Fi Biladis Sudan, also ‘protected’ communities in the Birnin Gwari area of the state against bandits, while controlling local governance with extremist violence.
As banditry started spreading from Zamfara to Sokoto, Nigerian security forces remained stretched on multiple internal and cross-border conflict fronts. According to a review of media reports dating back to 2018 and an account of a local informant, the only part of Sokoto that received some military attention against banditry was the Eastern Senatorial District, which borders Zamfara
A hybrid actor: economic predation masked by religious doctrine
Currently, Lakurawa enforces a rigid social order, appointing imams, punishing youth for shaving or listening to music and imposing a strict dress code. More ominously, it extorts farmers and herders under the pretext of zakat (a mandatory form of almsgiving in Islam intended to support the needy), masking economic predation with religious justification. Amid spreading Sahelian jihadist violence, Lakurawa uses radical Islam to justify social control and brutal punishment of dissent.
This early influence, in addition to its roots in community self-defence, may help explain Lakurawa’s adoption of dawah activities, extreme religious doctrine and its initial arsenal that enabled it to take on armed bandits. Although the group reportedly maintains contact with jihadists in Mali, it is independent of JNIM and not a wing.
However, while Lakurawa’s ideological roots lie in its connections with Malian jihadist groups, its operational strategy demonstrates a clear alignment with criminal activities, particularly when it comes to the extortion of local populations. This pragmatic shift towards economic predation, masked by religious rhetoric, has enabled Lakurawa to establish a foothold in areas that were previously under the control of non-ideological bandit groups.
This ideological openness to predation likely led JAS and Lakurawa to form an alliance, blending jihadism with economic crime and sustaining themselves through cattle raids, crop seizures and extortion disguised as zakat. JAS’s tolerance for such practices has entrenched it in Shiroro, enabling pragmatic integration with non-ideological bandits to share resources and co-produce violence. With Lakurawa in the mix, there is now a heightened risk of consolidating armed groups that fuse jihadism and organised crime across northern Nigeria and the Benin–Niger corridor.
Nigeria’s banditry crisis and a scenario of Lakurawa collaboration
Armed bandit groups have terrorised northwestern Nigeria, particularly Sokoto, Zamfara and Katsina States as well as Niger State in the central region for over a decade, killing thousands, displacing rural communities and creating an economy of ransom, cattle rustling and illicit mining. The problem is deeply rooted in resource competition and ethnic tensions. Desertification and shrinking grazing lands heightened conflict between predominantly Fulani pastoralists and mostly Hausa farming communities. In Zamfara, what later became known as ‘banditry’ began as Fulani ethnic militias armed themselves to resist Hausa-dominated vigilantes (yan sakai), who were accused of injustice, extorting, harassing and killing Fulani pastoralists in the name of community protection.
Over time, Fulani self-defence groups evolved into heavily armed gangs that moved beyond their original grievances, turning to cattle rustling, kidnapping, illegal mining and mass killings. While the cycle of violence has persisted, with vigilantes continuing to target and profile Fulani communities indiscriminately as criminals, many young Fulani men are pushed towards bandit groups, both for revenge and as a means of survival.
This illustrated a worrying pattern of normalising security outsourcing to non-state actors. This dynamic is not unique to the Lakurawa case or Nigeria. Across the Sahel, similar groups have emerged as ‘protectors’ in contexts where state capacity is weak or absent. In Nigeria’s Kaduna State, a Boko Haram splinter group, Ansarul Muslimina Fi Biladis Sudan, also ‘protected’ communities in the Birnin Gwari area of the state against bandits, while controlling local governance with extremist violence
Recruitment, mode of operation and targets
Lakurawa maintains strong operational mobility. After each attack, its fighters retreat, making them harder to track and confront. Its operations centre on preaching and violent raids on villages, especially during harvest seasons, during which they seize crops and livestock under the guise of zakat collection. Resistance often leads to killings.
Lakurawa fighters also employ tactical ambushes. During March 2025 interviews, vigilante members in Argungu recounted how Lakurawa fighters split their force: some conducted the raid, while others lay in wait to ambush pursuing villagers. An example occurred on 6 April 2025 in Morai, Augie LGA, where 16 vigilantes were killed in such an ambush while trying to recover stolen cattle. Lakurawa appears to have the capability to make or acquire improvised explosive devices, likely as a result of its interactions with JAS. Locals blamed Lakurawa for a bomb explosion in Gwabro village in Tangaza, on 8 June, which killed six people.
Although Lakurawa had defended communities against bandits and cattle rustlers, armed raids targeting cattle have become the hallmark of its operations in villages across Sokoto State and Kebbi State. As a Sahelian Fulani-rooted group, cattle are central to Lakurawa’s cultural identity, but the group’s interest goes beyond that. It has a strategic stake in cattle, tied not only to its survival but also to its operational funding. ‘They are after cows. They hardly go away without cows. They also preach to people, but they will insist they are taking cows away in the name of zakat, and attacks happen when they are resisted,’ said a community vigilante leader in Argungu LGA, Kebbi in March 2025.
Agriculture, including cropping and pastoralism, is the mainstay of the local economy in the areas where Lakurawa operates, which highlights the immense damage the group is causing to livelihoods. Its targets include not only sedentary Hausa farming communities but also Fulani pastoralists, showing that its violence is not strictly ethnically motivated. Fulani victims are often extorted or required to pay to retrieve their stolen herds. In Niger, the group concentrates its operations on the Niger–Benin oil pipeline and regularly sabotages it using improvised explosive devices.
However, while Lakurawa’s ideological roots lie in its connections with Malian jihadist groups, its operational strategy demonstrates a clear alignment with criminal activities, particularly when it comes to the extortion of local populations. This pragmatic shift towards economic predation, masked by religious rhetoric, has enabled Lakurawa to establish a foothold in areas that were previously under the control of non-ideological bandit groups
Limited response and risks of outsourcing community defences to vigilantes
The Nigerian government, particularly, should have learnt from creating a vacuum that led communities to outsource their security to Lakurawa, before it eventually turned against them. However, the government and state security forces remain far removed from the affected communities, leaving civilians to rely on local vigilantes, without adequate control and accountability, to defend against Lakurawa. Meanwhile, the security forces only engage the armed group occasionally.
After years of state absence, Nigerian security forces vowed to dismantle the group’s threat following the November attack in Kebbi and subsequent media attention. Efforts to respond to the group have since been sporadic, with few sustained and coordinated operations in affected LGAs. A Special Operations Brigade of the military reportedly killed six Lakurawa fighters in Gudu, Sokoto, in January 2025, but this sort of targeted offensive mission is infrequent.
As communities are largely left to their fate, there is fear that those on the Sokoto side are already forced to tolerate Lakurawa, enduring a life under brutal criminal sovereigns, while those in Kebbi are organising local vigilantes in self-help. In one case that the ISS monitored, vigilantes in Arewa LGA of Kebbi killed a Lakurawa kingpin, Maigemu, in a gun duel in March 2025. The operation came days after Lakurawa had killed six people in two villages (Bagiza and Rausa Kade) of Arewa LGA
Yet, allowing vigilantes to take charge of community defences without an accountability framework poses significant risks and can lead to an endless cycle of conflict, especially amid the growing tension between the Hausa and Fulani ethnic groups in the region. The Lakurawa group is often perceived as Fulani, which means that Hausa-controlled vigilantes might target innocent Fulani settlements in misguided acts of retaliation. This occurred after Lakurawa’s first deadly attack in Mera, Kebbi, in November 2025, when survivors mobilised against local Fulani settlements. This mirrors issues that have previously escalated crises in neighbouring Zamfara and Katsina.
Over time, Fulani self-defence groups evolved into heavily armed gangs that moved beyond their original grievances, turning to cattle rustling, kidnapping, illegal mining and mass killings. While the cycle of violence has persisted, with vigilantes continuing to target and profile Fulani communities indiscriminately as criminals, many young Fulani men are pushed towards bandit groups, both for revenge and as a means of survival
While Lakurawa’s leadership structure and ideological affiliations remain opaque, its Sahelian root is established, and it maintains connections to Sahelian jihadist and arms smuggling networks. Without a coordinated cross-border strategy, efforts to dismantle Lakurawa’s presence on one side of the border only push the group further into the other.
Conclusion and recommendations
Expand preventing and countering violent extremism operations to northwestern and central Nigeria: In particular, the non-kinetic aspects of Nigeria’s preventing and countering violent extremism efforts are still largely focused on the Lake Chad and northeastern region. This must change by recognising the growing threats in the north-central and northwestern regions and coordinating civilian and military responses that address the drivers and opportunities for extremist violence.
Strengthen government presence and invest in livelihoods and infrastructure: Authorities should prioritise state presence through the provision of human capital enhancement services, security, development and livelihood programmes in affected areas to counter opportunities for Lakurawa and other armed groups. It is important to invest in sustainable water and grazing access and crop production services, such as irrigation, to address the resource pressures.
While Lakurawa’s leadership structure and ideological affiliations remain opaque, its Sahelian root is established, and it maintains connections to Sahelian jihadist and arms smuggling networks. Without a coordinated cross-border strategy, efforts to dismantle Lakurawa’s presence on one side of the border only push the group further into the other
Improve intelligence and community trust: Build partnerships with communities for early warning and safe reporting systems, while enhancing coordination between aerial and ground forces for quick and effective response to threats. It is important to integrate civilian insights into operational planning to reduce civilian harm and avoid alienating communities.
Strengthen local security networks under state oversight: To complement state security, communities should strengthen community protection groups but embed them within formal accountability structures to prevent ethnic profiling, indiscriminate violence and vigilante abuses.
Promote local anti-violent extremism measures: Organise measures through religious leaders and local influencers to promote tenets of Islam that encourage tolerance, respect for constituted authorities, moderation and shunning of crimes among community members.
A multi-actor, multi-scale and multi-pronged context-fit strategy is the only viable path forward. By combining enhanced military action, cross-border cooperation and community-centred development, Nigeria and its partners can dismantle Lakurawa’s networks and prevent it from becoming yet another entrenched armed actor in the region.