Authors:  Katie Auth, Anthony Carroll, Alexander Csanadi, Andrew Danik, Ramsey C. Day, Saskia Holman, Nicolas Lippolis, Jane Munga, Christian-Géraud Neema, Sylvester Quansah, Blain Solomon, Tani Washington, Gilles O. Yabi

Site of the publication: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Type of the publication: Research Paper

Date of the publication: December 2024

Link to the original document

 

Extracts from pages/ Les extraits proviennent des pages : ( 1, 3, 5,15-17, 25, 27-28, 29-31, 33-35, 43-45, 53-56, 61-64, 65-68 )

Background

America now frames its relations with the rest of the world, including Africa, through the lens of great power competition. Within this geopolitical context, recent U.S. national security strategies have in various ways underscored the role of the African continent in the pursuit of American strategic interests whether for maintaining supply chain security, securing UN votes, or containing risks. This recognition of Africa’s importance to U.S. strategic interests is happening amid parallel efforts by other global powers. China is Africa’s largest bilateral trading partner and investor in energy projects. Russia is negotiating new security partnerships with countries ravaged by terrorism in West and Central Africa. Türkiye has expanded its diplomatic engagement to nearly all of the continent. Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, among others, are important investors and brokers to various political movements in the Horn of Africa.

Even where U.S. policy tools and approaches are beginning to evolve, insufficient resources are devoted to shoring up this engagement with Africa. Unlike critical diplomatic positions in China, India, Southeast Asia, and Europe, positions associated with Africa tend to be unfilled. Many U.S. embassies on the African continent have no commercial officers or economic counselors.

Meanwhile, the African continent is changing rapidly in ways that defy both optimistic forecasts and pessimistic predictions. Africa has the world’s youngest and fastest growing population, which, by mid-century, will have the second largest cluster of the world’s working-age population. The continent’s fifty-four countries have signed on to the African Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA), which is the world’s largest free trade area. Despite significant implementation challenges of the AfCFTA, the march toward regional integration is decisive. The African Union’s Agenda 2063, a blueprint for the continent’s industrial transformation, is reinforced by national-level strategies to reach middle- or high-income status by mid-century.

The incoming U.S. administration of President-elect Donald Trump, with its decisive electoral mandate, should boldly reimagine the U.S. economic relationship with Africa in dynamic ways that advance U.S. strategic interests while being grounded in Africa’s current realities. Supported by majorities in both houses of Congress, the incoming administration should design an updated policy framework for its Africa engagement focused on high impact areas, commit resources toward implementation, and staff crucial Africa-related positions with personnel capable of engaging with and driving this new agenda.

AGOA and Beyond: Reinvigorating and Repurposing the U.S.-Africa Trade Relationship

Zainab Usman and Anthony Carroll

The U.S.-Africa trade relationship is diminishing as the global trading environment rapidly changes. One major change has been China’s rise. In 2009, China overtook the United States as Africa’s top bilateral trade partner. During the 2024 Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), China announced that starting in December 2024, it would eliminate tariffs for goods from forty-three countries classified as the world’s “least developed,” thirty-three of which are in Africa. It is worth noting that China’s trade program offers much less generous product and country coverage than AGOA, African exports under AGOA are more diversified than African exports to China, and the U.S.-Africa trade relationship is characterized by a healthier trade balance with some African countries, even recording a surplus in several cases. Another major change is the African continent’s embrace of free trade. It has moved ahead, albeit slowly, with regional integration; fifty-four signatories and forty-eight countries have ratified the African Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA), the world’s largest free trade area by number of participating nations.

The uncertainty around the future of AGOA and GSP is driving a narrative that the United States is uninterested in expanding its commercial diplomacy on the continent and disengaged from Africa’s economic development. Ultimately, the frequent use of AGOA to achieve wide-ranging socio-governance objectives subordinates and undermines the U.S.-Africa trade relationship by reducing confidence among foreign investors that market access is assured. The new administration should proactively reimagine, reinvigorate, and repurpose the U.S.-Africa trade relationship for a mutually beneficial partnership that advances both U.S. and African interests in a new era of geopolitical competition.

Policy Recommendations

The new administration could discuss with Congress the reauthorization and repurposing of AGOA as a strategic economic partnership that benefits both the United States and African nations. Through the National Security Council and the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative and working with Congress, the administration could establish a framework for reauthorizing AGOA. The program has historically enjoyed wide bipartisan support having been enacted and reauthorized by Republican-led and Democrat-led administrations respectively.

The new administration could look at rebranding the program from AGOA to a  strategic economic partnership with Africa. This potential rebranding would convey the  evolution of AGOA from the aid orientation that underpinned the Trade and Development Act of 2000 to a strategic economic partnership fit for today’s geopolitical realities in which such trade programs should advance U.S. strategic interests. In this case, a repurposed trade  relationship with Africa would be directly beneficial to U.S. interests of securing supplies of minerals and metals critical for electric vehicle (EV) batteries, semiconductors, renewable energy hardware, and defense-industrial applications vital to U.S. national security. It would also encourage two-way trade in digital services and help diversify pharmaceutical supply chains that currently depend on China.

Ideas for Implementation

In reimagining, reinvigorating, and repurposing the U.S.-Africa trade relationship for a new  era of geopolitical competition, the incoming administration should consider the following:

• Look at expanding AGOA or a potential strategic economic partnership is an opportunity to expand the trade relationship with more countries. One potential way the expansion could be achieved is by restoring the AGOA privileges of some  countries and not overloading the program with lofty political provisions that  African countries lack the capabilities to implement.The program should expand its definition of “Africa” to include all  countries that have ratified the AfCFTA.
• Restore the trade hubs program to increase AGOA utilization and support trade facilitation initiatives. During the first years after AGOA’s passage in 2000,  the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) established regional  trade hubs that facilitated exports from eligible African countries. The trade hubs  accomplished two goals: they increased African exporters’ market knowledge and  identified and often remedied non-tariff trade barriers that hindered exports to the  United States and, within Africa, imports originating in the United States.
• Trade and Development Agency (USTDA) to ensure  adherence to strategic goals, monitor performance, and promote U.S. technology  platforms in infrastructure, telecommunications, and mineral and industrial  processing so that the United States does not cede leadership to Chinese or other  competitors in setting standards for these activities.

Strategic Reorientation and Realignment of U.S. Health Aid to Africa

Zainab Usman and Saskia Holman

The U.S. government is a major actor in global health and across the African continent. It  is the largest donor of bilateral aid to Africa, allocating billions of dollars annually  toward health interventions. In 2022, of the $17.2 billion the United States disbursed for  development assistance for health (DAH) across fifty-three African countries, $5.7 billion,  or 33 percent, was disbursed to health-related initiatives. Of this $5.7 billion,  93 percent went to disease-specific and reproductive health programming including HIV/AIDS, malaria, maternal and child health, family planning and reproductive health, and  tuberculosis overseen by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the  U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS).

Despite the volume and breadth of U.S. bilateral DAH to Africa, it falls short of its potential. U.S. bilateral health assistance has increasingly diverged from the health security priorities identified by both African countries and the U.S. government. U.S. DAH to  Africa overwhelmingly focuses on infectious disease and reproductive health initiatives,  which sometimes but not always include strengthening health systems. In addition, U.S. DAH structural interventions, including linkages to economic and social sectors, are sometimes insufficient. In a changing geopolitical environment where the United States aims  to reposition itself in Africa as a partner of choice, the new administration should consider  how to reorient the billions of dollars spent annually on DAH to serve both U.S. priorities  for health security and the economic development needs of African countries.

Ideas for Implementation

Africa’s health systems continue to face structural challenges and global health partnerships  that have a limited transformative impact. In the post-pandemic era, the new administration  has the opportunity to chart a new way forward for DAH to Africa that advances U.S.  interests, supports African economic prosperity and opportunity, and promotes locally led  development with the following action steps.

• Support the regional manufacturing of medicines and other products by  S. companies in Africa. The U.S. government should ensure that its bilateral  DAH programs in Africa enable collaborations between U.S. companies and  African stakeholders in developing local and regional health supply chains. This  would include supporting the creation of a fully integrated supply chain to ensure  sustainable African manufacturing of medicines, vaccines, and therapeutics. U.S.  companies could invest in and support the growth of vaccine-supporting industries,  including those that produce active vaccine ingredients, inactive ingredients, and  consumables. Another component should be strengthening the raw material and  intermediates supply chains that are crucial for vaccine production.
• Advance a vision for global health partnerships that promote the philosophy of self-reliance among African partners. As the world’s largest bilateral donor,  the U.S. government has a lot of influence in the global health community. It can  utilize its financial might and influence among the OECD-DAC countries and  multilateral organizations to encourage global health partnerships that align with its  “journey to self-reliance”.
• With the consideration of the above, the U.S. government can enter a new era of health  assistance to Africa that not only supports the continent’s economic development needs but  also ensures global health security for Africa, the United States, and the world.

Constructive U.S. Engagement  with West Africa and the Sahel

The countries of the central Sahel Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger occupy a strategic position between West, North, and Central Africa. Since 2012, these countries have seen insecurity and violence by armed separatist and jihadist groups spread rapidly over vast territories and further south into border areas with coastal countries. In 2023, Burkina Faso was the country most affected by terrorism, according to the Global Terrorism Index. Three other West African countries Mali, Nigeria, and Niger were in the top ten countries most affected by terrorism.

Between 2016 and 2019, the United States built an air base in northern Niger’s Agadez region, establishing Niger as a privileged partner in terms of military cooperation and the projection of American forces in the region. However, faced with pressure from the military leadership following the coup in July 2023 which called into question military cooperation and the U.S. troops’ presence and despite diplomatic efforts, U.S. troops were forced to leave Niger.

The change in Sahelian states’ external alliances and postures has indeed been spectacular, resulting in a brutal rejection of France’s military and political influence and a decline in the presence and influence of Western countries. At the same time, Russia, Türkiye, and other countries have emerged as much more welcome players in a context where the priority of military leaders is above all to reconquer territory by confronting all hostile armed groups and to keep power. Russia is now the new preferred partner of the countries in the Sahel for military cooperation; its military commitment remains significant in Mali, while it is emerging in Burkina Faso and is limited so far in Niger.

An analysis of security, political, economic, and social developments in West Africa cannot ignore the overall trajectory of Nigeria, the region’s demographic and economic powerhouse. Nigeria is the United States’ second-largest trading partner and third-largest destination for U.S. foreign direct investment in Africa, and its security and economic prospects will be decisive for neighboring countries, regional integration, and the future of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), which is in a difficult situation after the announcement in January 2024 of the withdrawal of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger from the regional community.

From the United States’ part, after the bipartisan Global Fragility Act of 2019 was passed, the Joe Biden administration published the U.S. Strategy to Prevent Conflict and Promote Stability (also known as the Global Fragility Strategy, or GFS) in 2020. The Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa, published in August 2022, reiterated an important aspect of the GFS, committing to use diplomacy, development, and defense as “tools to strengthen and enable partners to respond to the drivers of conflict advance regional stability [and] provide internal security.” Many of the countries identified for the implementation of the GFS are in Africa, including Libya, Mozambique, and “Coastal West Africa” comprising.

Policy Recommendations

In order to support regional integration in West Africa and advance U.S. security goals, the incoming U.S. administration should:

• Maintain engagement across West Africa by investing in a significant diplomatic presence on the ground. This will help create a better understanding of the internal dynamics of the countries in the region. It will also improve U.S. relations with all segments of society, while continuing to contribute to the restoration of security, political stability, and economic and social development in the Sahel, Nigeria, and other countries.
• Acknowledge the demand for sovereignty on the part of decision makers and citizens in West African countries and for more balanced and respectful relations with all non-African partners, including the United States, despite the extremely unequal economic balance of power.
• Support initiatives to reform ECOWAS and create the conditions for Sahelian countries to return to the organization so that the region can take charge of its own collective security. Engage with individual ECOWAS member states on regional issues, especially those with more economic and demographic weight. Engagement should start with Nigeria, encouraging its leaders to take more responsibility as a regional power toward strengthening ECOWAS capacity to be the leading institution on strategic thinking on regional peace, security, and economic issues.
• Prioritize cooperation in strengthening human capital, with health, education, and vocational training as essential sectors, regardless of the political and security situation in West African countries.

Deepening U.S.-Africa Ties with AI and Cybersecurity Initiatives

The Issue

In the past two decades, Africa has experienced immense growth in digital technologies with significant impact on socioeconomic development. Technology has the potential to contribute up to $15.7 trillion to the global economy by 2030, with $1.2 trillion gains in Africa, Oceania, and developing Asian countries representing a 5.6 percent increase in the region’s GDP by 2030.

However, new technologies also bring new threats, to say nothing of existing challenges such as lack of access to affordable internet, digital devices, digital skills, and robust policy regimes.

The rise of artificial intelligence (AI) presents significant potential advantages, but these benefits can only be realized if safety issues and risks associated with AI are effectively managed. Additionally, the interconnected nature of contemporary digital platforms presents cybersecurity risks that transcend geographical boundaries. An attack on one African nation could extend into another region, including North America, given the increased digital linkages between the United States and African countries. In 2023, Africa suffered the highest average of weekly cyber-attacks compared to other regions. It is therefore critical to integrate initiatives focused on AI and cybersecurity into the incoming administration’s vision for its digital partnership with Africa.

The U.S. digital policy toward Africa has included initiatives such as the Digital Transformation with Africa Initiative, U.S.-Kenya digital cooperation, and elements of Prosper Africa and Access Africa, all of which have significantly enhanced digital collaboration between the United States and African countries. The new administration now has the chance to engage in AI and cybersecurity to further enhance U.S.-Africa cooperation.

The United States should deepen its U.S.-Africa digital partnership with the following efforts:

• AI flagship project. To close the AI access gap and unlock AI’s potential as a powerful tool for digital collaboration between the United States and Africa, the incoming U.S. presidential administration should create a dedicated project focused on supporting the creation and deployment of safe, secure, and trustworthy AI for sustainable development.
• Initiative to mitigate the digital divide with secure digital infrastructure. The incoming administration should work to boost collaboration between the United States and African countries on combating cybercrime by developing secure and trusted information and communication technology infrastructure. It should mobilize resources through Prosper Africa or other agencies to support the deployment of U.S.-based connectivity infrastructure across the continent.
• AI and cybersecurity present opportunities for the United States and African nations to deepen digital diplomacy, while also aligning all countries’ strategic priorities. The emergence of AI presents opportunities for economic growth; however, realizing these benefits requires mitigation of associated risks. A deepened U.S.-Africa digital collaboration can help achieve this.

In 2023, Africa suffered the highest average of weekly cyber-attacks compared to other regions. It is therefore critical to integrate initiatives focused on AI and cybersecurity into the incoming administration’s vision for its digital partnership with Africa

Energy Security Compacts: A New Approach to Advancing U.S. National Security Through Energy Investment

The Issue

Investing in global energy solutions particularly in countries facing energy poverty is not merely good development policy. It is key to U.S. diplomacy, economic partnerships, and national security. More than ever, core U.S. interests depend on bolstering the energy security of key allies, including in Africa. Examples include the following:

• Mineral-rich countries that could be major partners in diversifying global energy supply chains but need reliable, affordable power to drive mining, processing, and manufacturing. For instance, Zambia accounts for about 4 percent of global copper supply and wants to expand production. But extended drought conditions have made power less reliable and more expensive, threatening the sector’s growth.
• Countries in which energy poverty constrains economic activity and job creation, triggering instability and unrest. Electricity outages contribute significantly to unemployment across sub-Saharan Africa.
• The United States has great tools to support global energy, whether through direct investment, financial guarantees, commercial advocacy, or technical assistance. Unfortunately, the capacity to bring those elements together in a way that actually solves big problems in specific countries is hamstrung by a few critical gaps.

Policy Recommendations

The incoming administration should work with Congress to give the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) the mandate and capacity to implement Energy Security Compacts, as proposed by the Energy for Growth Hub, that could address the primary constraints to energy security in a targeted set of specific countries. MCC could also coordinate the rest of the interagency in contributing relevant tools and resources.

MCC is an underappreciated tool for supporting global energy infrastructure, with a model that fills many of the gaps in the broader U.S. development finance ecosystem, including a holistic, country-specific approach codesigned and led by the partner country, the ability to fund crucial public infrastructure, and a mechanism to hold partners accountable for tough reforms.

MCC and the National Security Council (NSC) would co-lead a process of country selection, identifying cases in which energy security investments would advance shared goals. MCC and the country would then jointly assess the highest priority energy security needs and negotiate a five to ten year bilateral compact, anchored by a significant MCC grant and complemented by interagency contributions in the form of project investments, guarantees, and technical assistance.

Halting Africa’s Brain Drain Through Targeted Reform of the U.S. International Student Visa Regime

The Issue

The current U.S. visa system can be better structured to support the incoming administration’s national security priorities, with particular emphasis on tools to increase and strengthen bilateral relationships with African partners. A targeted reform of the U.S. student visa regime can offer a more efficient path to operationalize an already highly selective pool of nonimmigrant global leaders. The exchange of intellectual capital and human capacity is as much a trade relationship as any other, and empowering skilled African youth to gain formal or technical education in the United States will benefit both the American economy and students’ home countries.

Notably, other countries both U.S. allies and competitors are receiving more African students than the United States. The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace’s 2023 analysis, “What Are the Top Global Destinations for Higher Education for African Students?,” found that France and China surpassed the United States in hosting foreign African students. An effort to update the U.S.-Africa educational partnership would help reposition the United States’ educational soft power on the continent. Moreover, a May 2024 study found that the United States denied nearly 60 percent of African student visas in 2023. In fact, of the top fifteen nations where U.S. student visas were denied at an increased rate, African countries constituted the lion’s share at 80 percent.

These very high denial rates of African student visas to the United States should be of concern as the United States tries to compete with China in low and middle-income countries around the world. By 2050, more than 25 percent of the global population will be African. An increase in the presence of African students in the United States helps to strategically secure commercial, industrial, and political footholds abroad.

Policy Recommendations

The incoming administration should make targeted reforms to the international student visa structure that occur alongside programmatic innovation in broadening U.S. education access and partnership building. Visa reforms should build on efforts to strengthen programmatic initiatives like the Young African Leaders Initiative (YALI) and the State Department’s historically Black colleges and universities (HBCU) administrative exchange program, which both increasingly reflect the United States’ changing perspective on the role of global intellectual capital.

First, the new administration should create a separate preferential visa class for students applying to graduate programs in STEM, which could include selective qualification for expedited visa appointments, increased and specialized staff, or waived or reduced visa fees.

Moreover, a May 2024 study found that the United States denied nearly 60 percent of African student visas in 2023. In fact, of the top fifteen nations where U.S. student visas were denied at an increased rate, African countries constituted the lion’s share at 80 percent

Second, the incoming administration should design initiatives that directly engage major U.S. and African universities and technical institutions with one another, which would promote stronger U.S. capacity to develop domestic intellectual capital. The U.S. Bureau of African Affairs’ University Partnerships Initiative (UPI) between the Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology, the Texas International Education Consortium, and Iowa State University stands as an example ripe for replication. Carnegie’s recent publication, “Realizing the International Potential of the CHIPS and Science Act’s Technology Hubs,” also provides a detailed account of initiatives that support bilateral technical relationships with individual African countries and cities. These initiatives were created by the U.S. Africa Command State Partnership Program, which encourages the development of economic, political, and military ties between U.S. states and partner nations.

How the United States Can Compete with China for African Hearts and Minds

Christian-Géraud Neema

The U.S.-Africa relationship is entering a new phase of unknowns and uncertainties. President-elect Donald Trump’s return to the White House could open a new era of U.S.-Africa relations because he campaigned on an ambitious domestic and foreign policy agenda. Overall, these uncertainties are intrinsically rooted in the possibility that every four years, a new administration in the White House could make significant policy shifts and even reversals. These uncertainties are reinforced by the contrasting nature and position of the two major U.S. political parties on various global issues.

Where does the incoming administration stand on Africa? Should the continent expect a continuation of Donald Trump’s 2018 Africa strategy, a modification of Joe Biden’s strategy, or an overhaul of both plans and a launch of a new one ?

Under the new administration, the bipartisan consensus on countering China and Russia’s presence and expansion in Africa will remain an important driver of U.S. policy toward Africa. The administration’s policy toward the continent will take place in a moment of renewed partnership between China and African nations. The September 2024 Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in Beijing revealed China’s long-term engagement and strategy toward the continent. The final declaration and Beijing’s 2025–2027 action plan encompass China’s plans for Africa’s development and industrialization needs, as well as both parties’ hopes for a reformed international system, with the inclusion, for instance, of Africa as a permanent member of the UN Security Council.

First, the new administration should create a separate preferential visa class for students applying to graduate programs in STEM

Policy Recommendations

The new administration’s approach to Africa should bring reassurance, consistency, and a forward-looking world vision. In this vein, it would be helpful for the new administration to avoid the debunked narrative of Chinese debt traps, which ultimately undermines the credibility of American strategy in Africa.

Reassurance

The uphill battle for a constructive policy toward Africa will be to convince African countries that U.S. engagement is about Africa and America first; it is not a relationship that should be viewed solely through the prism of China, Russia, or any other actors. While U.S. engagement with the continent will naturally be about U.S. interests, it should also be about Africa itself and the United States’ concrete offer to address economic and development needs. The insistence from African leaders that they will not take sides and that Africa will not be the battleground of a new Cold War between the West and China reinforces the need to not make the competition with China the centerpiece of U.S. policy in Africa.

A Positive Vision for the Future

The new administration will have to reckon with the reality that Global South countries, especially in Africa, are calling for a reformed international system that is multilateral and fair to all, not only to the powerful.

Ignoring these calls and preserving the current status quo will not win Africa’s hearts. China, which has pledged to support Africa’s demands for integration into the UN Security Council, is positioning itself as the partner Africa needs in an international system that both China and Africa want to be different.

The administration may take a series of moves to signal its intention to respond to growing calls for reforming the international system.

However, trying to punish South Africa for its sovereign right to maintain relationships with Russia and China and hold its stance on the war in Gaza which was supported by many in Africa might signal that the administration is not interested in a constructive vision of the future and that it is instead focused on maintaining a status quo that suits its interest. This kind of stance would further pave the way for China’s narrative for change in Africa to gain ground.

Second, the incoming administration should design initiatives that directly engage major U.S. and African universities and technical institutions with one another, which would promote stronger U.S. capacity to develop domestic intellectual capital

Bolstering U.S. Strategic Partnerships with Africa Through High-Level Diplomacy

Ramsey C. Day

The diplomatic relationship between the United States and Africa has varied significantly by country, but several common characteristics have been present for the past sixty years. The United States has historically focused on issues of security, development, and humanitarian assistance in Africa. The continent has traditionally ranked lower on the U.S. foreign policy priority list than other regions, but demographic, geostrategic, and economic developments in recent years suggest the continent should play a more prominent role in American foreign policy. As the United States seeks to reinvigorate its engagement, the need for a thoughtful approach to strengthen diplomatic ties and facilitate mutual economic growth has never been clearer. The incoming U.S. administration presents a unique opportunity to redefine, modernize, and strengthen the U.S.-Africa partnership in ways that benefit both parties.

High-level diplomatic engagement will be critical in establishing trust, clearly articulating the vision and intent of a modernized relationship, and promoting strategic dialogue between the United States and African nations, both individually and collectively. Regular visits from high-level U.S. officials and the inclusion of African leaders in discussions of global significance convey a message of respect and acknowledgment of the continent’s increasing importance to American interests. Prioritizing strategic engagement, rather than lecturing, will foster collaboration on pressing issues such as job creation, digital transformation, critical minerals, two-way trade and investment, good governance, inclusive energy policies, and security cooperation.

Policy Recommendations

As the new administration considers its agenda, several messaging priorities should guide its approach to Africa.

First, define the goal of transitioning the relationship from aid-centric to a robust and diversified economic partnership as a top priority. This entails not only linking continued investments in democratic governance, health programs, and humanitarian aid to American values but also helping to establish Africa as a viable and attractive economic destination for American commercial investment.

Second, clearly communicate to all African nations that their respective level of commitment to modernizing their relationship with the United States will determine the level of American diplomatic engagement and development assistance. Any expectations that President-elect Donald Trump will continue to support historical levels of foreign assistance in traditional sectors through traditional methods in the absence of a clear commitment to the reforms necessary to modernize the relationship are likely to be met with disappointment.

Ideas for Implementation

The Trump administration should pursue several high-level diplomatic actions to reinforce its messaging to African leaders:

• Host a U.S.-Africa business summit. A pivotal step in enhancing U.S.-Africa relations would be to host a U.S.-Africa business summit within the first two years of the administration. This flagship event, on par with the 2014 and 2022 U.S.-Africa Leaders Summits, but framed in a markedly different manner, would serve as a platform for government officials, private sector leaders, and leading entrepreneurs from the United States and Africa to discuss economic opportunities and partnerships on the continent.
• Plan a presidential visit to Africa in the first year of the administration. A high-profile presidential visit to Africa within the administration’s first year would set a positive tone for U.S.-Africa relations and indicate how important redefining the relationship is to the United States.
• Emphasize security cooperation with two critical priorities: Promoting energy accessibility and security. African nations are increasingly becoming metaphorical battlegrounds for geopolitical competition, and the United States must play an active role in ensuring the countries’ energy security. Collaborating on energy security initiatives not only mitigates regional conflicts but also strengthens economic ties by creating partnerships to achieve abundant energy sources to fuel African job creation and economic growth.
• Ending the Sudan civil war. The civil war in Sudan is a scourge on the continent far too reminiscent of bygone eras and not reflective of Africa’s aspirations for alleviating poverty and being a global player through greater integration into the international economic system.