Type of the publication: Outcome paper
Date of the publication: September 2026
Author: Thoughts & Mace Advisory
Site of the organization: thoughtsandmaceadvisory.com
This report stems from the “Africa and Democracy Quarterly Dialogue,” a platform created by Thoughts & Mace Advisory to address the difficult issues that public events often tend to sidestep. In Africa, and more specifically in West Africa, the regular holding of elections does not always guarantee the exercise of effective democracy. Citizens experience a form of governance that is distant, predetermined, and lacking in accountability. This summary document is of paramount importance, as it lucidly explains how form becomes disconnected from democratic function. It highlights the manipulation of institutional mechanisms, which favor practices that gradually weaken the separation of powers, limit political competition, and reduce opportunities to hold public action accountable. For this reason, two concepts were introduced during this dialogue: namely, “performative democracy,” which refers to a system in which democratic procedures are maintained in appearance while the mechanisms of participation, accountability, and the protection of rights gradually lose their substance; and “state capture,” which refers to the systematic use of institutions, rules, and public resources for the benefit of private, partisan, or elitist interests. The value of this report lies in its effort to move beyond an exclusively institutional or even electoral interpretation of African crises. The value of this report lies in its effort to move beyond an exclusively institutional or even electoral interpretation of African crises. It demonstrates that, in reality, coups d’état, for example, are merely the consequence of a failing system. They can result from the manipulation of constitutional reforms, partisan appointments to lead oversight institutions, opaque financing of political parties, the misappropriation of public resources, and the use of certain legislative provisions to restrict freedom of expression and association. The report also examines people’s democratic aspirations as well as their perceptions of democracy. To this end, the analysis draws on data from Afrobarometer, Round 10, which included approximately 50,961 interviews conducted in 38 countries across the continent between 2024 and 2025 as well as the “V-Dem 2026” report. An analysis of these sources reveals that 64% of Africans prefer democracy, but only 36% actively demand it; 47% consider their country to be a democracy; and 38% are satisfied with how it functions. Ultimately, the report offers insights into the democratic crisis our region is facing. It thus calls for a rethinking of how democracy functions in our states and the conditions necessary for effective citizen participation. It proposes recommendations for six categories of actors—including governments, civil society, the AU and regional communities, international partners, the media and online platforms, and citizens—as well as a five-year results framework. Pourquoi avons-nous choisi ce document ? Ce rapport est issu du « Africa and Democracy Quarterly Dialogue », une plateforme créée par Thoughts & Mace Advisory afin d’aborder les questions difficiles que les événements publics ont souvent tendance à éluder. En Afrique, et plus particulièrement en Afrique de l’Ouest, la tenue régulière des élections ne justifie pas toujours de l’exercice d’une démocratie effective. Les citoyens vivent une forme de gouvernance lointaine, jouée d’avance et sans redevabilité. Ce document de synthèse est d’une importance capitale, car il explique lucidement comment la forme se dissocie de la fonction démocratique. Il met en évidence la manipulation des mécanismes institutionnels, qui sont favorables à des pratiques qui affaiblissent progressivement la séparation des pouvoirs, limitent la concurrence politique et réduisent les possibilités de contrôle de l’action publique. C’est pourquoi, deux notions ont été introduites, durant ce dialogue, notamment la (performative democracy), qui désigne un système dans lequel les procédures démocratiques sont maintenues en apparence alors que les mécanismes de participation, de responsabilité et de protection des droits perdent progressivement leur substance ; et la « capture de l’État » (state capture), qui renvoie à l’utilisation systématique des institutions, des règles et des ressources publiques au profit d’intérêts privés, partisans ou élitistes. L’intérêt de ce rapport réside dans sa volonté de dépasser une lecture exclusivement institutionnelle voire électorale des crises africaines. Il démontre qu’en réalité, les coups d’État par exemple, en sont que la conséquence d’un système défaillant. Il peut résulter d’instrumentalisation des réformes constitutionnelles, nominations partisanes à la tête des institutions de contrôle, financement opaque des partis politiques, détournement des ressources publiques et utilisation de certaines dispositions législatives pour restreindre les libertés d’expression et d’association. Le rapport interroge également sur les aspirations démocratiques des populations ainsi que leur perception de la démocratie. Pour ce fait, l’analyse s’appuie sur des travaux réalisés par Afrobarometer, Round 10, dont environ 50 961 entretiens dans 38 pays du continent entre 2024-2025, ainsi que sur le rapport « V-Dem 2026 ». À travers une lecture de ces sources, nous notons que 64 % des Africains préfèrent la démocratie, mais que seuls 36 % en expriment la pleine demande, que 47 % considèrent leur pays comme une démocratie et que 38 % sont satisfaits de son fonctionnement. In fine, le rapport offre des clés de lecture de la crise démocratique que traverse notre région. Il invite ainsi à repenser le fonctionnement même de la démocratie dans nos États, et les conditions d’effectivité de la participation des citoyens. Il propose ainsi des recommandations pour six catégories d’acteurs, notamment gouvernements, société civile, UA et communautés régionales, partenaires internationaux, médias et plateformes, citoyens, ainsi qu’un cadre de résultats sur cinq ans.Why do we choose this document?
This report highlights several lessons for countries in the WATHI region. The report calls for looking beyond procedural democracy—that is, beyond the regular holding of elections and the mere existence of institutions. It thus proposes assessing democratic quality based on the independence of institutions, their actual functioning, and their ability to produce concrete results for the people. For countries in our region, it is important to strengthen the independence of oversight institutions (electoral commissions, courts, audit institutions, and anti-corruption bodies). The goal is to combat corruption. To achieve this, appointments must be transparent and inclusive. Furthermore, institutions must be independent, their mandates protected, their budgets secured, and their powers enforceable. Ultimately, an institution that is independent on paper is not enough if it is subject to the will of the executive branch. The report also calls for prioritizing the prevention of democratic backsliding through continuous monitoring of political institutions and practices, rather than focusing vigilance solely on election periods. This is particularly important for a region where election periods are marked by tensions and conflict—which are merely the consequence of such practices. It seems prudent to ensure continuous monitoring—by both institutions and citizens—of appointments, public procurement, legislative reforms, and political financing. The quality of the electoral competition is, in fact, determined well before Election Day. Changes to constitutional rules, restrictions on candidates’ access, control over public media, and the lack of transparency in political financing can all contribute to distorting the conditions of the competition. Such vigilance also requires protecting civic space and independent media—a necessity. Freedom of expression is increasingly restricted not by explicit bans, but by laws on cybercrime, misinformation, or public order. These laws must respect the principles of necessity and proportionality and be subject to independent judicial review. Civil society and the media need sustainable resources, legal protection, and security measures. Furthermore, citizen participation must be effective. In reality, citizens’ disengagement can stem from repeated participation that yields no change. This particularly affects young people, women, rural populations, and marginalized groups, whose presence in decision-making bodies does not guarantee their influence. Participation at the local level must be strengthened, access to budgetary and administrative information must be facilitated, and follow-up on expressed concerns must be monitored. Finally, strengthening regional cooperation appears essential to prevent democratic backsliding. The report highlights the weakness of regional mechanisms in the face of gradual forms of institutional capture. Regional early warning systems must be expanded to include gradual backsliding. Regional organizations are more likely to react to a coup d’état than to the gradual weakening of checks and balances by elected governments (constitutional amendments, partisan appointments, restrictions on freedoms). ECOWAS and the African Union must incorporate these forms of regression into their early warning mechanisms, using transparent criteria, and ensure independent monitoring as well as consistent enforcement of standards. Quelles leçons pour les pays de la zone WATHI ? Ce rapport met en évidence plusieurs enseignements pour les pays de la zone WATHI. Le rapport invite à regarder au-delà de la démocratie procédurale, c’est-à-dire au-delà de la tenue régulière d’élections et de l’existence d’institutions. Il propose ainsi de juger la qualité démocratique à l’indépendance des institutions, à leur fonctionnement réel et à leur capacité à produire des résultats concrets pour les populations. Pour les pays de la zone de notre région, il importe de renforcer l’indépendance des institutions de contrôle (commissions électorales, juridictions, institutions d’audit et organes de lutte contre la corruption). L’idée est de lutter contre la corruption. Pour y arriver, les nominations doivent être transparentes et pluralistes. Et les institutions doivent être indépendants, leurs mandats protégés, leurs budgets garantis et leurs pouvoirs applicables. Au fond, une institution indépendante sur le papier ne suffit pas si elle dépend de la volonté de l’exécutif. Le rapport invite également à privilégier la prévention des reculs démocratiques à travers une surveillance continue des institutions et des pratiques politiques, plutôt qu’une vigilance concentrée sur les seules périodes électorales. Pour une région, dont les périodes électorales sont marqués par des tensions et de conflictualité. Elles n’en sont que la conséquence. Il apparaît judicieux d’assurer une veille continue, institutionnelle et citoyenne, sur les nominations, les marchés publics, les réformes législatives et le financement politique. La qualité de la compétition électorale se joue en effet bien avant le jour du scrutin. La modification des règles constitutionnelles, les restrictions à l’accès des candidats, le contrôle des médias publics ou encore l’opacité du financement politique peuvent contribuer à fausser les conditions de la compétition. Une telle vigilance suppose également de protéger l’espace civique et les médias indépendants est inéluctable. La liberté d’expression est de moins en moins restreinte par des interdictions explicites. Elle peut l’être par des lois sur la cybercriminalité, la fausse information ou l’ordre public. Ces textes doivent respecter les principes de nécessité et de proportionnalité, et être soumis à un contrôle judiciaire indépendant. La société civile et les médias ont besoin de ressources durables, de protection juridique et de moyens de sécurité. Par ailleurs, la participation citoyenne doit être effective. En réalité, le désengagement des citoyens peut venir d’une participation répétée qui ne change rien. Cela touche particulièrement les jeunes, les femmes, les populations rurales et les groupes marginalisés, dont la présence dans les instances ne garantit pas l’influence. Il faut renforcer la participation au niveau local, faciliter l’accès aux informations budgétaires et administratives et suivre les suites données aux préoccupations exprimées. Enfin, le renforcement de la coopération régionale apparaît indispensable pour prévenir les reculs démocratiques. Le rapport relève une faiblesse des mécanismes régionaux face aux formes progressives de capture institutionnelle. Il faut étendre l’alerte précoce régionale aux reculs graduels. Les organisations régionales réagissent plus facilement à un coup d’État qu’à l’affaiblissement progressif des contre-pouvoirs par des gouvernements élus (modifications constitutionnelles, nominations partisanes, restrictions des libertés). La CEDEAO et l’Union africaine doivent intégrer ces formes de recul dans leurs mécanismes d’alerte, avec des critères transparents et assurer un suivi indépendant ainsi qu’une application cohérente des normes.What lessons for the countries of the WATHI Zone?
Extracts from pages/ Les extraits proviennent des pages: 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 21
The evidence in one view
Across 38 countries surveyed in 2024 and 2025, 64 percent of Africans preferred democracy, but only 36 percent met Afrobarometer’s fuller test of democratic demand: preferring democracy while rejecting one-person, one-party and military rule. Only 47 percent considered their country a democracy, and 38 percent were satisfied with how democracy worked. V-Dem’s 2026 assessment found that nearly one-quarter of the world’s countries were autocratizing in 2025, with freedom of expression the most common target.
These figures show that citizens have not simply rejected democracy. Many are withdrawing confidence from systems that claim democratic legitimacy without producing democratic accountability. The gap between demand and perceived supply is narrowing for the wrong reason: public demand is weakening faster than performance is improving. This makes the legitimacy crisis especially dangerous. When elections appear unable to change incentives, courts appear unable to constrain executives and public institutions appear unable to protect people, authoritarian alternatives begin to look less exceptional.
The dialogue identified six connected features of the current crisis: executive domination of appointments and oversight; manipulation of electoral and constitutional rules; the commercialization of political competition; repression through security and digital law; dependence that compromises civil society and media; and an implementation gap that leaves vulnerable communities protected in law but exposed in life.
The paper argues for a shift in democratic reform. Election support remains necessary, but it cannot remain the organizing centre of the field. Reform must operate between elections and below the national level. It must strengthen the independence of institutions through appointment, tenure and budget rules; expose the money and networks behind capture; secure independent public-interest media; build permanent civic infrastructure; and measure democracy by whether people can obtain justice, information, services and influence without fear or patronage.
Citizens still value democracy, but confidence is thinning
The African democratic story contains two truths at once. A clear majority still prefers democracy and rejects authoritarian alternatives. At the same time, satisfaction with democratic performance remains low. Afrobarometer’s 2026 Pan-Africa profile found that 64 percent of respondents preferred democracy. Seventy-nine percent rejected oneperson rule, 76 percent rejected one-party rule and 65 percent rejected military rule. Yet only 36 percent qualified as fully committed democrats across all four measures. Across 29 countries tracked over a decade, full demand for democracy by citizens fell by 10 percentage points The distinction matters. A citizen may prefer democracy in principle while becoming willing to tolerate military intervention after repeated corruption, insecurity or electoral manipulation. That conditional support is a warning about democratic delivery. It also helps explain why constitutional order can lose public defenders before formal institutions collapse.
Afrobarometer’s comparison also shows a narrowing between demand and perceived supply, from 11 points in 2014 and 2015 to four points a decade later. The change is not evidence of democratic convergence. The survey analysis links weaker demand to worsening evaluations of government performance. Citizens are adjusting expectations downward.
Elections are necessary but no longer sufficient as the main test
The discussion repeatedly returned to the limits of election-centred analysis. Observation missions often arrive after the decisive structural choices have been made. Candidate access may already be restricted. Electoral commissions may lack independent appointment procedures. Campaign finance may be opaque. Public media may favour incumbents. Security agencies may intimidate opponents, and courts may have lost credibility long before petitions are filed.
Seventy-nine percent rejected oneperson rule, 76 percent rejected one-party rule and 65 percent rejected military rule. Yet only 36 percent qualified as fully committed democrats across all four measures. Across 29 countries tracked over a decade, full demand for democracy by citizens fell by 10 percentage points The distinction matters. A citizen may prefer democracy in principle while becoming willing to tolerate military intervention after repeated corruption, insecurity or electoral manipulation. That conditional support is a warning about democratic delivery. It also helps explain why constitutional order can lose public defenders before formal institutions collapse
A technically orderly election can therefore confirm a political settlement produced outside election day. The appropriate question is broader: did citizens have a realistic opportunity to organize, obtain information, compete, vote and seek remedy under rules that did not structurally privilege those already in power? Democratic assessment must move from the visible event to the institutional chain that produces it. This is very critical for election observers and reinforces the need for a more rigorous process before validation of cosmetic election outcomes.
Capture works through institutions as often as against them
State capture is frequently imagined as an external assault on public institutions. In practice, it often operates through lawful mandates and routine procedures. Control of appointments shapes who leads the electoral commission, judiciary, prosecution service, anti-corruption agency, military command and state-owned enterprises. Budget dependence disciplines nominally independent bodies. Procurement links political office to commercial patrons. Parliamentary majorities convert executive preference into legislation, while selective enforcement protects allies and exposes opponents.
This is why visible institutional activity can coexist with declining accountability. A captured parliament may sit frequently. A captured court may hear cases. A captured regulator may produce annual reports. The central test is whether these institutions can impose costs on powerful actors when law and evidence require it.
Political finance closes the gate before voting begins
The financialization of politics emerged as a central concern. When party nominations, campaigns, media access and coalition building require extraordinary resources, political equality is compromised before ballots are printed. Wealthy candidates and their sponsors gain disproportionate influence over legislative priorities, appointments and public contracts. Women, young people, persons with disabilities and locally rooted candidates may appear in inclusion statistics while remaining excluded from viable competition. The result is a political cartel with incentives that survive changes in party control. Opposition parties may condemn capture while excluded from power and reproduce it once elected. Alternation then changes officeholders without changing the operating system. This helps explain why citizens can experience elections as a movement without transformation.
This is why visible institutional activity can coexist with declining accountability. A captured parliament may sit frequently. A captured court may hear cases. A captured regulator may produce annual reports. The central test is whether these institutions can impose costs on powerful actors when law and evidence require it
Institutions are designed to depend on the power they oversee
Many oversight bodies have formal mandates but weak operating independence. Their leaders may be appointed or removed through executive-dominated processes. Budgets can be delayed, cut or controlled by ministries. Investigative access may depend on cooperation from the agencies under review. Decisions may be advisory rather than enforceable. These design choices allow governments to cite the institution’s existence while limiting its capacity.
South Africa’s Chapter 9 model was raised as a useful constitutional approach because it explicitly establishes institutions to strengthen constitutional democracy. The wider lesson is that independence must be engineered through plural appointment processes, protected tenure, direct and predictable funding, disclosure requirements, judicially enforceable powers and public reporting. Good individuals cannot substitute for durable design.
Civil society has been pulled into the electoral calendar
Traditional donor practice often funds civic work close to elections and withdraws once observation reports are published. This encourages organizations to build temporary coalitions, train monitors and produce recommendations without maintaining the local relationships and institutional memory required to pursue reform between cycles. Repeated participation in flawed processes can also make civil society appear to validate systems it privately distrusts.
Funding dependence compounds the problem. Organizations that rely on governments, corporate patrons or a narrow group of international donors may avoid positions that threaten future access. Media outlets face similar pressure when advertising and ownership are concentrated. Independence is therefore an economic question as much as an ethical one.
Vulnerability reveals the quality of the whole system
Women, girls, young people, rural communities, minorities, persons with disabilities and low-income citizens often encounter institutional failure first and most severely. Their experience is therefore not a specialist inclusion concern at the edge of democracy. It is a diagnostic test of whether power is accountable. If the least connected citizen cannot obtain protection or remedy, formal equality is performing a symbolic function rather than a governing one.
South Africa’s Chapter 9 model was raised as a useful constitutional approach because it explicitly establishes institutions to strengthen constitutional democracy. The wider lesson is that independence must be engineered through plural appointment processes, protected tenure, direct and predictable funding, disclosure requirements, judicially enforceable powers and public reporting. Good individuals cannot substitute for durable design
This is also why aggregate representation can mislead. A parliament may contain more women or young members while party control, campaign finance and patronage limit their independence. Inclusion should be assessed through agenda-setting power, resource access, constituency contact, legislative influence and safety, not only seats occupied.
Protect independent information as democratic infrastructure
Independent media should be treated as a public good without making journalists dependent on government. Possible models include transparent pooled funds administered by independent trustees, membership and subscription models, cross border investigative partnerships, university-based reporting hubs, philanthropic endowments and public-interest advertising rules with audited allocation criteria.
Support should cover more than content production. Newsrooms need legal defense, digital security, data analysis, long-term investigative capacity and revenue development. Civic organizations also need trusted verification channels so that rapid online mobilization is grounded in evidence.
Change institutional incentives, not only institutional leaders
Personal integrity matters, but institutional renewal cannot depend on finding unusually courageous officeholders. Appointment rules should require cross-party and public participation, published criteria and reasoned decisions. Terms should be protected and staggered. Budgets should be released automatically according to law. Conflicts of interest, assets, procurement and political donations should be disclosed in usable formats. Sanctions should be enforceable and reviewable.
Women, girls, young people, rural communities, minorities, persons with disabilities and low-income citizens often encounter institutional failure first and most severely. Their experience is therefore not a specialist inclusion concern at the edge of democracy. It is a diagnostic test of whether power is accountable. If the least connected citizen cannot obtain protection or remedy, formal equality is performing a symbolic function rather than a governing one
Constitutional review can help where it begins with a clear diagnosis of how power operates and where citizens have time and information to shape the outcome. The Ghanaian consultation model discussed in the dialogue illustrates the value of examining the gap between stable elections and weak social or economic performance. Reform should not become another elite process designed to ratify a predetermined amendment.
Strategic Recommendations
Directions for Democratic Renewal
For Civil Society and Social Movements
- Shift resources from election-season mobilization to continuous monitoring of appointments, procurement, budgets, constitutional changes, political finance and enforcement.
- Build community information and accountability nodes that can document local problems, verify evidence and escalate cases through legal, media and oversight channels.
- Agree on thresholds for naming democratic violations. Distinguish administrative weakness from capture, and use evidence to identify when institutions are being deliberately neutralized.
- Diversify income through membership, earned services, pooled domestic philanthropy, diaspora support and transparent endowment models. Publish funding sources and conflict-of-interest safeguards.
- Invest in movement safety: legal defense, digital security, psychosocial support, emergency relocation and secure evidence storage.
- Measure civic work by institutional or community change, not only events held, people trained or reports produced.
For National Governments and Reformist Public Officials
- Reform appointments to electoral bodies, courts, prosecutors, anti-corruption agencies, auditors and security leadership through published criteria, multi-actor nomination, public interviews and reasoned selection decisions.
- Protect oversight budgets through direct statutory appropriations and transparent release schedules. Publish any delay, reduction or reallocation.
- Adopt enforceable political-finance rules covering donations, beneficial ownership, campaign expenditure, third-party spending, state resources and online advertising. Data should be published in machine-readable form before elections.
- Review cybercrime, false-information, public-order and surveillance laws against necessity, proportionality and independent judicial authorization. Repeal provisions used to criminalize legitimate journalism, dissent or organizing.
- Create public implementation scorecards for rights-based laws, linking each obligation to a budget, responsible institution, geographic coverage, complaint mechanism and remedy.
- Strengthen local government autonomy and transparency so that participation produces decisions closer to citizens and does not depend entirely on central executive discretion.
A Five-year Results Framework
