Author(s): Gustavo Carvalho, Annette Leijenaar
Date of Publication: 11 Mar 2019
Over the past five years, there has been a great deal of debate about the African Union’s (AU) ability to rapidly deploy a combat force in crisis situations. Neither of the two bodies intended for this purpose – the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises (ACIRC) and the African Standby Force (ASF) – have ever been deployed. This raises major questions about their relevance and viability in Africa’s fast-changing peace and security environment.
On 9 January, the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) adopted a matrix to ‘harmonise’ ACIRC and the ASF. This long-awaited integration is a step forward but could add to existing misunderstanding and uncertainty. As two distinct, but in many ways overlapping, tools for peace support operations, ACIRC and the ASF have competed for resources, capacity and attention. Bringing them together into an effective force will take time and skillful political negotiations.
One of the main stumbling blocks at this stage is getting buy-in from the 14 states that signed up to participate in ACIRC. There is a strong sense that members will not let go of the initiative without proper consultation. Three influential member states (Angola, Egypt and Rwanda) are currently on the PSC which is scheduled to address the matter again on 26 March.
They have an important role of linking discussions in the PSC to those among other ACIRC members. The biggest challenge the three PSC members will face is Nigeria, which has been outspokenly negative about ACIRC from the very start. Established by the AU in 2003, the ASF was designed as a continental force composed of standby contingents. These were to be multi-disciplinary, with civilian, police and military components ready for rapid deployment at short notice.
Ten years later the AU set up ACIRC, partly due to frustration around the delays in getting the ASF off the ground. It was also seen as a reaction to France being called in when the West African regional force failed to stabilise Mali in early 2013.
ACIRC was initially led by South Africa and later joined by countries such as Senegal, Rwanda and Angola. It was designed as a voluntary stopgap solution until the ASF became fully operational. But rather than remaining an interim measure, ACIRC developed a life of its own, diverting attention away from debates about how the AU ought to implement peace support operations. At a time when strong and swift decision making was required, ACIRC muddied the waters.
According to the PSC’s new matrix, the completion date for integrating ACIRC within the ASF framework is February 2020. The model sets out the logistical, legal, operational and tactical steps required, but doesn’t spell out what exactly is meant by ‘harmonisation’. The financing and sustainability of an integrated ASF and ACIRC also needs to be clarified. Like other AU entities, both have depended on external donors for their development and implementation.
Most ACIRC headquarter staff are funded by the European Union (EU) African Peace Facility. The EU has also paid for several ASF continental exercises. ACIRC has been rightly criticised for drawing EU funding away from the more permanent ASF, as well as the unnecessary duplication of functions and efforts.
In the process of bringing the two forces together, the AU also needs to ask why African states have on several occasions opted to deploy their own coalitions rather than call on the ASF or ACIRC. The Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) against Boko Haram is a good example.
‘In the case of the MNJTF, Nigeria was unwilling to cede operational command and control to anyone but its own army,’ says Stephanie Wolters, Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for Security Studies (ISS). ‘Even today, the MNJTF remains mostly Nigerian-led, with the other countries having significantly less influence and control over the force.’
The MNJTF case shows how important regional dynamics and capabilities are to the AU’s plans for peace operations. The ASF was always intended to operate through its regional standby forces. It has become clear though that while certain regions such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) can effectively deploy, others such as the North African Regional Capability have lagged behind.
Whether or not ACIRC and ASF are successfully harmonised, the AU needs to relook at its approach to peace operations more broadly. More than 15 years have passed since the ASF was established, and the environment in which it is expected to operate has changed considerably. Current conditions demand the rapid deployment of civilian, police and military components. Specialised skills and equipment are needed to deal with transnational crime, terrorism and counter-insurgency tasks.
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