Authors:  Abrak Saati, Matheus de Abreu Costa Souza

Site of the publication: um.edu

Type of the publication: Article                                                                           

Date of the publication:  2023

 

What is small, and what do we know about the political implications of smallness?

When we refer to ‘small’ in this study, we deal with states that have a small population size. In the literature that covers the comparative study of the political systems of states, and in particular the vein of research that is interested in the comparative study of small states, the cutoff point for what constitutes ‘small’ can vary. When we refer to islandness, we mean island states, that is, states that are surrounded by water. For the purposes of our inquiry, small island states are island states with a population size of around 500,000 individuals. Cabo Verde, the empirical interest of our inquiry, fits these criteria.

When it comes to the political implications of smallness and islandness, we argue that the theoretical literature is divided into two distinct factions where one is almost overwhelmingly convinced of the benefits, whereas the other is almost equally focused on the drawbacks.

Smallness, islandness and the pressure to conform to “a single code of conduct” can give rise to other political effects. Veenendaal has proposed that it is likely that political platforms become streamlined, that is, several political parties may exist but the extent to which their ideologies differ may not be that vast. Instead, smallness and islandness lead to a personalization of politics. When “everybody knows everybody”, it also follows that everybody knows the politicians and that the politicians know the voters either directly or indirectly. This dynamic inevitably provides fertile soil for corruption, patronage and clientelism. Proximity can thus be regarded in both a positive and negative light. On the one hand, it is advantageous for MPs to be able to easily reach out to the electorate and inquire about their needs, and for the electorate to easily get in touch with their MPs. On the other hand, from the perspective of strengthening democratic processes and procedures, close relationships between voters and elected officials can facilitate corrupt practices.

Our empirical inquiry on Cabo Verde also shows that this is a small island state in which political representatives have grown accustomed to engaging in cross-party dialogue, repeatedly and in a respectful manner. While this does not occur all the time or on all political issues, it happens frequently enough to ensure that democratic processes are respected and adhered to. This contradicts theoretical points of departure highlighting that, in small island states, individual MPs can be ostracized from their community – in this case, the political party – if they do not conform to the party line, disobey, or “sell out” to a rival political party.

The advantages of smallness and islandness as experienced by Cabo Verdean MPs

The interviews with Cabo Verdean MPs lend support to this idea. One respondent captured the very essence of this proposition:

[Closeness] is a huge advantage because politics, from my point of view, is made of relationships, personal and institutional relationships. And this relationship must be one of trust. I have a relationship of trust with my voters; we are a small country, everybody knows each other. It’s not just a political relationship of trust, but also a friendship, many of us are neighbours as well.

Another potential advantage of smallness and islandness that previous research has brought to attention relates to how these specific circumstances bring voters and political representatives closer to each other, not only geographically but also mentally and emotionally. This, in turn, can make the latter more aware of the grievances of the former. Almost all the interviewed MPs expressed sentiments to this effect. For example: You can see things closer; you can really understand the problems, analyse things better, and you are closer to what needs to be done and who needs it. You can also more easily analyse the impact of policies, measures and legislation on the population, on people’s daily lives.

Our empirical inquiry on Cabo Verde also shows that this is a small island state in which political representatives have grown accustomed to engaging in cross-party dialogue, repeatedly and in a respectful manner. While this does not occur all the time or on all political issues, it happens frequently enough to ensure that democratic processes are respected and adhered to

The disadvantages of smallness and islandness as experienced by Cabo Verdean MPs

Many of the experiences conveyed during the interviews substantiated theoretical notions that stress potential disadvantages of smallness and islandness. While close relations between the populace and MPs have their merits, this same closeness can also put pressure on MPs to deliver personal favours to voters.

Numerous experiences to support this notion were expressed. For example, one MP said: Sometimes [closeness] becomes a disadvantage because as a MP, I feel that they [the voters] put pressure. The population demands things from the MP.

Another respondent expressed it thus: People always go after the MP to ask for help to deal with different difficulties. So, we have hundreds of messages, phone calls asking…basically asking for money. To pay for university, to solve a specific health problem, to help their child with something, to pay for a ticket to emigrate, to pay for a ticket to visit their mother or father. This is our reality.

A third MP expressed a similar sentiment: A disadvantage is that a good percentage of the population have the idea that politicians put their hands in their pockets and money comes out….When people look for you, they also look for you to solve social problems, economic problems.

Cross-party dialogue in Cabo Verde

During our interviews with Cabo Verdean MPs, we noticed that – regardless of political affiliation – they stressed that continuous cross-party dialogue, in formal as well as in informal settings, has served Cabo Verdean democracy well. One respondent expressed it as: We have a close relationship with our opponents and relate to each other with courtesy; with kindness. We are opponents, but we … have good relationships, even becoming friends in some cases. That too, I think is a good thing. We have very cordial relationships between opponents although we have different standpoints.

This particular MP reasoned that this cordial way of relating to political opponents is a consequence of smallness. MPs might know or be acquainted with each other even prior to entering political office and continue to build on amicable relations that have already been established. As this respondent expressed: The Cape Verdean knows everyone: he is a cousin of this one, he is a brother of that one, he is a friend of that one, he knows your father, he knows your mother. It works like this in Cape Verde.

Other MPs did not make a direct connection between smallness/islandness and constructive cross-party interactions, but rather emphasised aspects related to democratic maturity and democratic culture as explanatory factors to amicable relations. To further their argument, the current cohabitation (as of 2021) between the president (from PAICV) and the prime minister (from MpD) was brought to attention: I think that cohabitation represents our reality; I think that we are starting to realise this and that we have reached a point where we can have political argumentations without conflict since there is a common goal of democracy.

In fact, cohabitation within the executive was brought to our attention several times by the MPs as an example of cross-party dialogue that, in their opinion, works productively. One MP even said that this specific type of cross-party dialogue ought to be “a great democratic lesson for other countries”. Another respondent stressed that cross-party dialogue at the highest political level – within the executive – is not an anomaly in Cabo Verde, pointing to the fact that cohabitation within the executive branch is now occurring for the second time since independence. Indeed, Cabo Verde has – at least according to our respondents – a previous experience of successful cohabitation.

From 2011 to 2016, the country had a president from MpD and a prime minister from PAICV. This could lend support to Cheeseman’s (2011) notion concerning “learning by doing” and that there might be an element of path dependency in creating good relationships between political opponents. We would, however, be cautious to draw any definite conclusions about constructive cross-party dialogue and a consensual political elite in Cabo Verde as stemming exclusively from good relations within the executive branch. Cohabitation has simply not occurred frequently enough for such a conclusion to be valid. Rather, other aspects in addition to smallness, and the consequential closeness between MPs (from different parties), may shed light on the matter.

During our conversations with Cabo Verdean MPs about the state of their democracy, we were struck by how nearly all respondents adamantly and repeatedly brought attention to the country’s constitution. They did so from two slightly different, yet related, perspectives. One of the reasons for why the constitution was called on when discussing the state of democracy, and why they viewed the country as a well-functioning democracy, was a sense of pride in having founding laws that are very explicit in terms of specifying the separation of powers between all branches of government.

They conveyed that this kind of precision leaves little or no room for ambiguity and, more importantly, for the risk of political quarrels over matters of interpretation. Respondents also brought the constitution to attention to underscore how all MPs fully understand and respect the rules of the political game. Exemplifying with the balance of power between the president and the prime minister, whether being from the same political party or from different political parties, one respondent expressed it thus: We have clear guidelines in the constitution when it comes to what is the responsibility of the President and what is the responsibility of the PM. Therefore, neither one can go beyond what is stipulated in the constitution; it is within this framework that they have to act.

The same MP concluded that an amicable institutional relationship is likely to build on good personal terms that have been nurtured over time: that individuals who are now finding themselves in the office of the PM or as the president of the republic have developed good relations and a habit of working together in parliament for many years prior to entering the highest offices of the country. Another respondent echoed this sentiment: Cabo Verde politicians have had very good political training and experience. This makes them capable of cohabitation in the best possible way.

Another MP said that successful cohabitation – when the president and the prime minister are from different political parties – requires “extraordinary political experience” and that it also depends on who the cohabitating political actors are. They argued that familiarity and prior experiences of engaging with each other politically is essential.

Another interviewee conveyed a similar response, also emphasising the constitution: Nothing is more natural for us than having a president from one political party and a PM from another. And why do I say that nothing is more natural? Because our constitutional arrangement is very good, it is very clear, it is very well defined. We have the constitution that dictates the rules of the game; each one has its own scope.