Authors: Bertelsmann Transformation index 

Site of publication: BTI

Type of publication: Report

Date of publication:  2024

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Political Transformation 

Stateness

Citizenship rights were one of the root causes of the prolonged civil conflict. For many years, important elements of citizenship have been denied to both the “northerners” and migrant workers who have resided in Côte d’Ivoire for decades. Politicians fueled the nationalistic notion of Ivoirité, promoting the belief that southerners were the true Ivorians, while xenophobic sentiments and actions targeted northerners, regardless of their Ivorian nationality.

Due to continued improvement throughout the last decade, the administrative apparatus provides all basic public services throughout the country.

Political Participation

After decades without elections or with heavily disputed presidential elections, all political actors today seem to accept elections as the main mechanism for access to political office, and elections are regularly held. However, Côte d’Ivoire has not yet seen a peaceful turnover of power through elections.

The latest electoral cycle (2020/21) again caused uproar and political frustration. Not only has the role of the Constitutional Court (allowing only four out of 44 candidates to run) been contested, but also that of the electoral commission. According to a ruling of the African Court on Human and People’s Rights, the legal norms governing the electoral commission did not respect international standards concerning impartiality and legal independence. However, all attempts by civil society groups to achieve a more inclusive governance of the electoral process were unsuccessful, as the government only offered minimal concessions. Social media was highly politicized and contributed to spreading disinformation and inciting electoral violence. The ensuing parliamentary elections in 2021 were much less controversial – and confirmed a majority for the ruling party – with all parties competing and accepting the results. It remains, however, unclear whether the political elite and the electoral administration will maintain a good quality of electoral governance in a fully open and inclusive electoral race for the presidency.

For most of the time since President Ouattara took office in 2011, the right of association has been upheld. The law provides for freedom of assembly and association, which has been generally respected – no ethnic or cultural minorities are marginalized in this regard. Advocacy groups operate freely, and union activity has also continued to be strong throughout. A vocal opposition can organize public rallies, hold conferences, and maintain their own media outlets.

Opposition media remain subject to occasional threats and pressures from the government, especially during electoral campaigns. The constitutional provisions for freedom of expression are therefore only partially respected in practice, and journalists remain, in principle, vulnerable to abuse by police. The media law from December 2017 has made insulting the president a crime. Côte d’Ivoire was ranked 66th out of 180 countries in the Reporters without Borders’ 2021 Press Freedom Index.

Rule of Law

Côte d’Ivoire has a long history of complete presidential control over the political process. The parliamentary elections of March 2021 re-established a fully legitimate parliament with representation from all major parties, but it is unlikely that parliament will become an effective institution of government oversight given the decades of structural annihilation of parliamentary oversight. Whether governmental actors are subject to the law is a matter of debate. There is no effective check on the government, with the judiciary poorly equipped to balance the hegemony of the executive.

Formally, the judiciary is institutionally distinct, but its decisions and doctrine have always been subordinated to the government of the day. Both the constitutional and the regular branch are vulnerable to executive intervention, lack adequate resources, and are riddled with corruption. According to data published by ENACT, links between state actors and international criminal syndicates continue to facilitate organized crime.

The death penalty was abolished with the reform of the Penal Law in 2015. The National Human Rights Commission has also been strengthened, providing representation for civil society organizations and gaining international accreditation since 2016, achieving a so-called A-Status since December 2020.

Stability of Democratic Institutions

The constitution provides for a democratic regime; no elite actor questions the legitimacy of democratic institutions per se. Nevertheless, the extent to which the behavior of elites is primarily shaped by these institutions can be questioned, especially in light of constitutional amendments to prolong presidential tenure. 

Given the dominance of the presidency, relatively little friction exists. However, this reduces the functional quality of other institutions, such as parliament, and more broadly speaking, horizontal and vertical accountability. Local government has very limited competencies and resources, and it is not a meaningful dimension of political participation or vertical accountability.

Democracy has become “the only game in town.” However, all elite actors adhere to a narrow and legalistic interpretation of democracy as majority rule, lacking sufficient institutionalized mechanisms of accountability, which may have actually diminished the legitimacy of democratic institutions in the eyes of significant portions of the population. Civil society actors are supportive of liberal democracy and often side with the opposition in claiming a more inclusive style of policymaking, including constitutional reforms or reform of the electoral commission.

Political and Social Integration

Three political parties, the FPI, the RDR and the PDCI, have dominated Ivorian political life since the mid-1990s, with all other parties failing to exceed 5% of electoral support. To some extent, violent conflict has impeded the development of the party system, making it difficult for new parties to emerge. 

Many interest groups – from cocoa planters’ associations to student unions – continued to exist even throughout the decade of violent conflict between 2000 and 2010. However, they cooperate only rarely and have very little influence on political processes. The country lacks a tradition of constructive relationships between the state and interest groups – the exception being the economically important export sectors. Additionally, there is little faith among social actors in the state’s willingness to listen to them. 

Important social interests, particularly religious and ethnically cross-cutting interest groups, remain underrepresented. These groups were much more active in the 1990s. Civil society, although formally represented in many state- or donor-led schemes, has generally not been able to shape public policies – for example, in the field of land reform. However, trade unions in the public sector remain quite strong and may mobilize heavily to defend their interests, such as in the case of pension system reforms. While there are numerous voluntary and independent civic and social associations, they suffer from limited funding and organizational deficiencies.

Governance 

Governance Performance

During the past few years, the Ouattara government has focused on economic reform and social policies. Overall, the government has developed a coherent agenda with the support of the international community, which was confirmed in its handling of the COVID-19 crisis and the response to inflation following the Russian invasion of Ukraine. 

The government has certainly not prioritized addressing politically conflictive issues, apparently hoping that economic growth and improved infrastructure will lower grievances – a calculus that somehow proved to be correct, although there was no level playing field in the elections. The government has successfully implemented most of its reform agenda, addressing the reorganization of key sectors and prioritizing the implementation of large infrastructure projects – especially roads and electricity – education, and health. It has shown notable progress in terms of improving access to electricity and increasing the literacy rate.

The government has also apparently become more effective in managing the security apparatus after many years of mutinies and conflicts within the army. Other areas that required more reform, such as judicial reform, decentralization, or the fight against corruption, were not a priority and thus not thoroughly implemented due to the technical complexity of the issues as well as the political resistance of key actors within the government.

Resource Efficiency

Budget policies and their transparency have been lauded by the IMF, and most observers agree that budgetary consolidation will most likely succeed – even in the face of pandemic- and war-related dynamics. Decentralization is not a priority of the current government, but the country has a very weak tradition of decentralized governance.

The government has apparently managed over the last few years to adopt a more centralized style of policy coordination, which might also reflect the strong personalization within the presidential system of Ouattara and his growing capacity to marginalize competing networks. Coherence in policymaking might, however, result more from the concentration of policymaking in the hands of the president and a technocratic team advising him – rather than from any more formalized coordination mechanism.

The effectiveness of the government’s anti-corruption policies and institutions remains unclear. The High Authority for Good Governance is involved in official investigations and publishes annual reports about its activities in the field of prevention, awareness-raising and investigation. However, it is not a judicial body that could effectively sanction corrupt practices.

 Consensus-Building

The political leadership that has been ruling the country since 2011 has a general commitment to democratic and economic transformation. However, the implementation of this agenda does not reflect a broad political consensus. 

The government restricts civil society’s involvement in the policymaking process as much as possible. In 2016, constitutional reform took place with the participation of hand-picked academics and influential personalities, but without the broader consultation of civil society.

Civil society has been unable to find a role in the fight against corruption. With the exception of trade unions, the current government – if not directly pushed from outside, as in the case of the accreditation of the National Human Rights Commission or with the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) – does not proactively involve civil society actors.

The general perception in Côte d’Ivoire is that the Ouattara government, instead of engaging seriously in reconciliation, imposed severe punishments on the “former enemies” due to widespread human rights violations and subsequently granted them pardons – a move that has drawn protest from many human rights defenders in Côte d’Ivoire.

International cooperation

The government has managed its relationships with the international community well, with the president having worked for the IMF in the past.

The current president, as well as the core ruling team, is well aware that the international community (especially the United Nations and France) was essential in securing access to office, and that the country’s stability will depend on the government’s capacity to maintain international trust and reputation. This does not exclude the possibility of inconsistent policymaking or cases of rent-seeking within the administration.

In 2017, Côte d’Ivoire accepted a decision by the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea to award a disputed maritime area, where gas reserves are explored, to neighboring Ghana. Côte d’Ivoire was the only African country to accede to the Rome Statute after 2010 (in 2013). However, the International Criminal Court had a significant impact on the country, as former President Gbagbo and his militia leader Blé Goudé faced trial in The Hague. (They were eventually acquitted in early 2019).

President Ouattara played a key role in advocating for ECOWAS military intervention in Mali and has a strong interest in promoting military cooperation with neighboring governments in Burkina Faso and Mali in their efforts to combat jihadist groups. Côte d’Ivoire was widely seen as the primary advocate for ECOWAS economic sanctions against the military regime in Mali.

Relations with Ghana and Liberia were temporarily strained due to the apparently tolerated presence of former top FPI officials in these countries and the continued influx of militias – in the case of Liberia. However, since 2014, bilateral relations have greatly improved with both neighbors. Côte d’Ivoire has maintained a relatively low profile within the African Union (AU). The Ivorian government has rejected the decision of the African Court on Human and People’s Rights to view the Ivorian Electoral Law as a violation of human rights.