Type de publication: Rapport

Date de publication: July 2025

Author: Flore Berger, senior analyst at the GI-TOC’s Observatory of Illicit Economies in West Africa.

Site of the organisation: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC)

Link to the original document

 

Extracts from pages/ Les extraits proviennent des pages : 5, 6-7, 7-8, 9-10, 11, 12-13, 14-15, 16-17, 18-19, 20-21, 23-24, 25-26, 27-28, 29

CATTLE RUSTLING AS PART OF THE CONFLICT ECOSYSTEM

Cattle rustling is a critical and often under-reported aspect of the security crisis in the Sahel and northern coastal states. It acts as a driver of conflict, as a governance and intimidation mechanism for actors seeking to exert influence over communities, and as a critical source of revenue for armed actors, including those associated with the state, VEOs or bandits. Since 2020, as VEOs like JNIM expanded southwards, the tri-border area where the Sud-Ouest, Bounkani and Upper West regions meet has faced security threats that have shaped and been shaped by the stolen livestock market. From early 2024, the VDP have also emerged as a considerable armed threat to stability in the region. Both JNIM and the VDP use cattle rustling as a method of control and intimidation. By targeting herders and their livestock, they terrorize the population, forcing displacement or compelling communities to accept their authority. Such practices have bred long-standing anger among a range of herder communities, particularly in central Mali since 2015 and Burkina Faso since 2018, where grievances over cattle theft have contributed to cycles of violence. Reprisals linked to cattle theft have often escalated tensions, prompting herders to arm themselves or align with armed groups for protection, while other communities may respond by forming self-defence militias.

Over time, these militias can become predatory actors themselves, further deepening the conflict. Cattle rustling is closely associated with the trajectory of violence in the region. Increases in rustling activities often precede or coincide with a deteriorating security situation, as armed actors intensify their operations. In particular, JNIM’s involvement in cattle rustling varies depending on its level of territorial control. In areas where the group is still asserting itself, it resorts to violent theft as a mechanism for power assertion and revenue generation. However, when these armed actors reduce their activities and consolidate their presence in a given territory, incidents of cattle theft tend to decline. Indeed, where JNIM has solidified its influence, it shifts to a more structured economic governance model. Instead of outright theft, JNIM imposes zakat (an Islamic tax on cattle owners), typically fixed at one bull calf for every 30 head of cattle and a heifer calf for every 40 head of cattle, which acts as both a revenue stream and a means of establishing legitimacy within the community. This transition shows that cattle rustling can also function as a tool for insurgent governance, reflecting the group’s adaptive strategies in response to its control over territory. This pattern highlights how those driving broader conflicts also play significant roles in the illicit cattle economy. The development of cattle rustling in this context underscores its critical role amid the dynamic conflict landscape in the region.

2018 to mid-2020: initial expansion and focus on resourcing

JNIM has notably been active in the Sud-Ouest region of Burkina Faso, the most unstable region within the tri-border area, since 2018. The group’s first attacks in the region primarily targeted security positions and forest guards’ posts in areas between Batié, Nao, Loropéni and Galgouli. But by early 2019, JNIM’s tactics had changed, shifting from direct confrontations to adopting a less visible presence, focusing on establishing themselves in strategic locations to facilitate further expansion and resourcing. This included localities along the Ivorian border between the Diéfoula and Dida forests, such as Mangodara (in the Cascades region) and Helintira (in the Sud-Ouest region). JNIM also focused on cultivating ties with existing contraband networks operating in these border areas to secure operational resources and financing streams. A key figure in the region is Rasmane Dramane Sidibé, known as ‘Hamza’, who since 2019 has been overseeing the entrenchment and resource-mobilization efforts of his katiba (or ‘battalion’ in Arabic), initially known as Katiba Alidougou, but currently referred to by JNIM as the Katiba Banfora region. Hamza succeeded Ali Traoré, who led the katiba during its earlier operations in the Cascades and Haut-Bassins regions starting in 2015. Hamza’s background as a student of Amadou Kouffa, the leader of the Katiba Macina (operating in central Mali), during his Koranic studies in Mali between 2010 and 2014 has forged significant links between the two katibas. Under Hamza’s leadership, the Katiba Banfora has concentrated on resourcing itself while also supplying resources to other katibas in the region.

Indeed, where JNIM has solidified its influence, it shifts to a more structured economic governance model. Instead of outright theft, JNIM imposes zakat (an Islamic tax on cattle owners), typically fixed at one bull calf for every 30 head of cattle and a heifer calf for every 40 head of cattle, which acts as both a revenue stream and a means of establishing legitimacy within the community. This transition shows that cattle rustling can also function as a tool for insurgent governance, reflecting the group’s adaptive strategies in response to its control over territory

The structure of the Katiba Banfora reflects this operational focus. Hamza oversees two key figures: ‘Jafar’, the co-leader of the katiba, and Abou Moussa, the head of logistics and resourcing. Both individuals are Ivorians. Jafar comes from Govitan, a remote village in the Tehini department of Bounkani region – less than 10 kilometres away from the Burkinabe border. He also studied in central Mali with Hamza (2010–2015), and is thus also linked to Katiba Macina, and heads the training and recruitment operations. Abou Moussa comes from Ouangolodougou in the Tchologo region, about 20 kilometres away from the Burkinabe border. It is slightly unusual in a katiba hierarchy to have such a direct relationship between the leader and the resource manager. This reflects not only the relatively limited size of the Katiba Banfora, but also its primary focus on resourcing and logistics, making Abou Moussa a central actor. Involvement in the livestock economy has been a crucial element of JNIM’s resourcing networks since its emergence.

The group’s participation in the cattle trade serves as one of the earliest indicators of its operations in the tri-border area, particularly along the Burkina Faso–Côte d’Ivoire border. As early as 2017, Ivorian investigations have linked to JNIM a figure known as Hadou, the head of a large cattle rustling network operating from Ouangolodougou. Intelligence sources believe that, between 2017 and Hadou’s arrest in 2019, the network generated about CFA60 million (€91 400) from the illegal sale of about 400 cattle and 200 sheep in northern Côte d’Ivoire. 11 Given the links between JNIM and Hadou’s network, it is believed that some of these revenues benefited the group. The Sud-Ouest region has hence been acting from the beginning of JNIM’s presence as a critical transit area for cattle, facilitating the movement of livestock stolen by JNIM in south-western Burkina Faso and further (Cascades, Hauts-Bassins, Boucle du Mouhoun) to Côte d’Ivoire. JNIM did not create these networks and routing. Rather, the stolen cattle trade is intricately tied to the broader livestock ecosystem in West Africa, which sees livestock largely bred in Mali and Burkina Faso, and then moving towards consumption hubs in coastal states such as Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana. In this context, Côte d’Ivoire, along with Ghana, relies heavily on imports from Burkina Faso, with the latter fulfilling up to 90 per cent of Ghana’s livestock consumption needs.

Mid 2020 to early 2022: expansion and loss in Côte d’Ivoire

Between mid-2020 and late 2022, JNIM executed a strategic expansion in Côte d’Ivoire while consolidating its operations in Burkina Faso. In Burkina Faso, by mid 2020, JNIM had established a stable albeit low-key presence in the Sud-Ouest region around the Dida Forest, in the strategic localities of Djigouè and Helintira. JNIM had also integrated itself in the criminal environment, operating on routes used by smugglers connecting the Sud-Ouest with the Bounkani region, and particularly from the Dida Forest to Comoé National Park (two corridors through the Ivorian localities of Tougbo and Tehini). This strategic positioning enabled JNIM to exploit the vulnerabilities of both national parks, using forested areas as logistical hubs, places of refuge and means to build legitimacy within the populations they interacted with. In 2020, only one JNIM attack was recorded in the Sud-Ouest. In June 2020, the group used its strongholds in Burkina Faso to launch an offensive against Côte d’Ivoire. The Kafolo attack, the first major attack on Ivorian security forces, marked the beginning of the offensive. Following this attack, JNIM carried out over 20 violent operations in the Bounkani and Tchologo regions, employing various tactics such as direct assaults on security installations, the use of improvised explosive devices and intimidation tactics that included the seizure of mosques and villages.

As JNIM escalated violence in Côte d’Ivoire, cattle rustling became a more overt aspect of its operations, and incidents increased in Bounkani and Tchologo regions. 18 Areas with rising rates of cattle theft corresponded to those which JNIM was infiltrating. The rise in the scale of cattle rustling incidents during this period was especially telling, as reported thefts escalated from a few cattle to entire herds – a trend seen elsewhere in the Sahel, including in central Mali (since 2015) and northern Burkina Faso (since 2018), showcasing JNIM’s entrenchment in the economy. This change indicated a clear shift, showcasing JNIM’s deeper involvement into the livestock economy. Reports indicated that incidents of cattle theft became increasingly brazen, occurring during daylight hours and often involving armed perpetrators who threatened herders and cattle owners, including through kidnapping or murdering those who resisted or challenged them. 20 The dynamics of stolen cattle trade also shifted during this time; previously, stolen cattle were typically funnelled south towards larger regional markets such Bouaké, Doropo and Bouna. However, from 2020 onward, this reversed direction, with stolen livestock increasingly trafficked up north towards Burkina Faso, to JNIM’s strongholds.

Intelligence sources believe that, between 2017 and Hadou’s arrest in 2019, the network generated about CFA60 million (€91 400) from the illegal sale of about 400 cattle and 200 sheep in northern Côte d’Ivoire. 11 Given the links between JNIM and Hadou’s network, it is believed that some of these revenues benefited the group. The Sud-Ouest region has hence been acting from the beginning of JNIM’s presence as a critical transit area for cattle, facilitating the movement of livestock stolen by JNIM in south-western Burkina Faso and further (Cascades, Hauts-Bassins, Boucle du Mouhoun) to Côte d’Ivoire

As JNIM deepened its engagement in the livestock economy in the borderlands on both the Ivorian and Burkinabe side, it positioned itself as the protector of herds, and many herders and cattle owners were compelled to accept the group’s presence and protection. Those who rejected JNIM’s influence faced severe consequences, including the theft of their animals and forced displacement from their land. The group further facilitated its entry into the livestock sector by leveraging young local herders as intermediaries, persuading them to establish relationships with cattle owners and transporters. JNIM often incentivized cooperation by offering large sums of money to cattle traders and transporters, effectively weaving itself into the economic fabric of the region. The Ivorian state responded to JNIM’s activities with a swift deployment of military force and the introduction of non-military resources, including development efforts aimed at bolstering community resilience. By the first quarter of 2022, this enhanced security presence appeared to have curtailed JNIM’s more overt operations, as only three attacks against the Ivorian armed forces were recorded in northern Côte d’Ivoire, after which offensive operations largely ceased. 23 By 2022, it became clear that while JNIM might have once harboured aspirations of expanding its footprint in northern Côte d’Ivoire, the group now treated the region primarily as a fallback area and resourcing zone. The increased security measures also reshaped JNIM’s involvement in the livestock economy, and altered its relationships with herders, traders and transporters.

Two key changes took place. First, the major cattle-smuggling corridor used by JNIM via Kafolo or Ouangolodougou became increasingly difficult to use. As a result, JNIM adapted its strategies, rerouting stolen livestock through Bounkani to reach new markets in Doropo and Bouna, where intermediaries played a crucial role in laundering the stolen animals. Second, JNIM began leveraging connections to Ghana as a new avenue for livestock trade, indicating a move away from reliance solely on the Ivorian markets. The year 2022 was a milestone for JNIM’s presence in the Upper West, with the group increasingly using Ghanaian territory to rest, hide and find resources such as food, fuel and motorcycles. Ghana remains the only coastal state in the central belt that has not been attacked by JNIM to date. JNIM’s experience in Côte d’Ivoire, and its prioritization of key supply chains and hiding areas, has likely shaped this strategy.

Early 2022–March 2024: Sud-Ouest under pressure

From early 2022 to early 2024, the Sud-Ouest region of Burkina Faso witnessed a significant escalation and then decrease in violence and unrest, primarily driven by the activities of JNIM. Cattle rustling incidents followed the same trajectory. Increased pressure from Ivorian authorities prompted JNIM to refocus its efforts back to Burkina Faso. This resulted in a marked rise in attacks on both state security forces and civilians. Despite the attempts of the Defence and Security Forces (FDS) to dislodge the group from its strongholds, JNIM intensified its campaign. By early 2022, JNIM had retained its strongholds and expanded further towards Kampti and Loropéni. The group restructured into a more organized formation, consisting of 5 markaz (zonal units), each comprising between 50 to 80 fighters. These units were based in Loropéni, Djigoué, Helintira, Balè Forest and Galgouli. Overall, the group had approximately 350 members, with about 60 per cent being Burkinabe, 20 per cent Ivorian, and the remainder hailing from neighbouring countries such as Ghana, Mali, Niger, Pakistan and Algeria. The deployment of the VDP to the Sud-Ouest in 2022 marked a new watershed moment. VDP members became prime targets for JNIM’s attacks, resulting in more than 50 recorded clashes between JNIM and military forces in 2022 alone. 29 Civilians often found themselves caught in the crossfire, leading to prolonged suffering and instability. Not only did violence increase, but so did cattle rustling incidents, as both groups looted livestock during armed confrontations.

This is a trend experienced nationwide in Burkina Faso, with the deployment of VDP exacerbating the conflict, which in turn leads to an increase in cattle rustling incidents. In areas where it was fighting the presence of the VDP, JNIM used cattle rustling as an intimidation tool. The targeting of villages by JNIM often coincided with the pillaging of livestock. Allegations of collaboration with the armed forces or hosting a VDP post made villages prime targets for JNIM raids. Targeted individuals and their families were typically forced to leave, or to ally with JNIM and receive protection. One marabout from Djigoué recalled an incident in mid-2022: ‘One evening the terrorists took 400 heads of cattle from me on the pretext that I make gris-gris for people [cast spells] and that I’m not honest, I’m corrupt and therefore I deserve to die and since I have to be killed, my property is rightfully theirs.’ The regional body of a herders’ association reported that, between 2022 and 2023, over 2 000 heads of livestock were stolen in the south-western area of Burkina Faso (the Hauts-Bassins, Cascades and Sud-Ouest regions). In localities where JNIM did not face competition from the VPD (Helintira, Djigouè, Loropéni and Kampti), the group imposed rules on local communities, collecting zakat and enforcing adherence to their interpretation of local governance. In the Sud-Ouest, the social contract implied by zakat payments was relatively loose, due to JNIM’s more limited presence relative to other areas. But it was to some extent accepted by communities, who received protection from JNIM against increased targeting by security forces and the VDP.

The year 2022 was a milestone for JNIM’s presence in the Upper West, with the group increasingly using Ghanaian territory to rest, hide and find resources such as food, fuel and motorcycles. Ghana remains the only coastal state in the central belt that has not been attacked by JNIM to date. JNIM’s experience in Côte d’Ivoire, and its prioritization of key supply chains and hiding areas, has likely shaped this strategy

In the Sud-Ouest, JNIM’s zakat on cattle owners claimed an estimated 400 cows in 2022, 250 in 2023 and fewer than 100 in 2024 – based on market prices, these hauls represented values of CFA160million (€243 920), CFA100 million (€152 449) and CFA40 million (€60 979), respectively. The downward trend reflects the growing resistance to JNIM’s influence across the Sud-Ouest from early 2024 By early 2023, the operational focus of JNIM in the Sud-Ouest region of Burkina Faso shifted significantly as large-scale operations decreased, although sporadic clashes persisted. This trend indicated a strategic recalibration; rather than pursuing aggressive territorial expansion, JNIM opted to consolidate its influence in established strongholds. This phase included ongoing zakat collection and deeper community engagement, reflecting a broader trend among VEOs in the Sahel, where violence gives way to engagement to secure territorial gains and develop financing streams. Livestock stolen through zakat collection or raids were funnelled along established smuggling routes into Côte d’Ivoire (Bounkani) and Ghana (Upper West). By 2023, the increase in cattle laundering operations in Ghana was notable, driven by enhanced border surveillance in Côte d’Ivoire, which was largely a response to concerns there about cattle laundering operations linked to the influx of refugees from Burkina Faso. Reports from the security forces indicated a significant rise in the number of cattle being stolen and laundered through Upper West, now often reaching hundreds per incident.

This escalation hinted at armed group involvement, suggesting that petty theft was overshadowed by organized operations requiring substantial capacity and control. 36 In the words of a security official from the Upper West: ‘The quantity of cattle often stolen defies what petty cattle thieves can manage to escape with. If you are talking about two or three or even 10 cows, no armed groups will waste their time on that. But what we see lately is hundreds in some cases, which clearly requires a certain force and control to be able to escape and get them sold. Evidence of JNIM’s alleged involvement in cattle rustling in Upper West itself (rather than merely using the subregion as a transit and laundering area) remains limited. Notably, a gang operating from a mountainous forest area in Kpari, near the Burkina Faso border, has emerged as a primary actor in the local cattle rustling scene. 38 The gang’s leader, reportedly a herder himself with ties to JNIM, is suspected of orchestrating the movement of large herds across the border, eliciting concerns from local traders and victims. 39 While some have reported the gang’s activities to the police, official responses have been scarce. Security officials, while acknowledging awareness of the gang, have remained reticent to comment.

March 2024 to March 2025: violence and rustling unleashed

In March 2024, a significant shift occurred not just in the conflict landscape of the Sud-Ouest region, but also within the cattle rustling market. A Burkinabe military offensive involving the VDP and the armed forces effectively expelled JNIM from its strongholds in Djigouè and Helintira. As counterterrorism operations in Burkina Faso increased, so did the VDP’s armed presence in Bounkani. The Gogo sub-prefecture in the Tehini department has been most severely impacted. Villages perceived to have been aligned with JNIM have endured numerous attacks, including lootings and cattle rustling, village chiefs have been kidnapped and others threatened, and community leaders have been summarily executed. Community members widely report that the perpetrators are VDP forces, as asserted in the testimony below: [In July 2024], the VDP wanted to settle in this village [Kohofi, Gogo sub-prefecture] to ensure the security of the people and their property, according to them. The village chief did not accept this proposal, as he felt that it was out of the question for the VDP, a militia group from another country, to settle in his village, which is an Ivorian locality.

The regional body of a herders’ association reported that, between 2022 and 2023, over 2 000 heads of livestock were stolen in the south-western area of Burkina Faso (the Hauts-Bassins, Cascades and Sud-Ouest regions). In localities where JNIM did not face competition from the VPD (Helintira, Djigouè, Loropéni and Kampti), the group imposed rules on local communities, collecting zakat and enforcing adherence to their interpretation of local governance

The village chief refused to collaborate with the VDP and alerted the prefectural and security authorities in Gogo to explain the situation. When they were informed, members of the Armed Forces of Côte d’Ivoire went on a mission to Kohofi. When they arrived, the soldiers found that the VDP had already left the area. Later, the VDP returned to Kohofi and kidnapped the village chief, and two other people close to him. They accused the chief of being behind an attack by terrorist groups on their post, in which, according to them, one of their brothers in arms had been injured and their two-wheeled vehicle set on fire. The VDP blamed the village chief for allowing the terrorist groups to attack them. […] The VDP then told the chief and the two other villagers that they would pay for the attack on them by the terrorist groups. The VDP abducted the village chief and the two villagers, and they have not been heard from since. The above highlights not only violence committed by the VDP in Côte d’Ivoire but the alleged expansion of the VDP’s mandate into the country. This research suggested that VDP predation was on an upwards trend, as further illustrated by a dramatic turn of events in late June 2025, when the VDP kidnapped five Ivorian gendarmes in Kalamon, a border community in Côte d’Ivoire. Following the March 2024 offensive, JNIM restructured its operational strategies, particularly its supply chains. Previously reliant on local supplies procured from larger towns such as Gaoua or Kampti, the group shifted to dependency on intermediaries in Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana for essential materials.

This strategic pivot underscores the group’s adaptability under military pressure. JNIM retreated into the Dida Forest, used as a base to operate in rural areas around Helintira, Djigoué and Loropéni, especially impacting villages such as Yerefoula, Koro and Nambi. However, the impact of these operations appeared to be limited. According to a trader in Djigoué: ‘We are under siege here in Djigoué. We cannot leave even 5 kilometres away from the town otherwise we will be attacked by the bushmen [referring to JNIM]. They attack us, and we traders can only move if we are escorted by the VDP and the army in a convoy.’ 48 This contrasts with the government narrative that security forces are gaining territory from JNIM in the Sud-Ouest and elsewhere, with interim president Ibrahim Traoré claiming 70 per cent of Burkina Faso has been retaken. As conflict parties fight to maintain their territory, cattle rustling incidents have also significantly increased in Burkina Faso and Côte d’Ivoire. This is partly attributable to JNIM: the group’s interactions with communities have become predominantly predatory as it faces competition for influence and pressure from the VDP. However, another critical factor driving the uptick in these incidents is the VDP’s growing involvement in cattle rustling.

Many herders and cattle owners in the Sud-Ouest and in the Bounkani report that the threats they now face often originate from the VDP rather than JNIM. This situation reflects a troubling trend where self-defence groups, originally formed to protect communities, transition into perpetrators of violence and theft against those perceived as enemies. The armed forces, particularly the rapid intervention battalions (bataillons d’intervention rapide, BIR), which are tasked with rapid response to threats, have also been implicated in cattle rustling activities. In the first three months of 2024, our data suggests that they have been reportedly involved in the rustling of up to 500 heads of cattle. While comprehensive data on looting by the VDP or the FDS is not available, dozens of testimonies of herders were collected, pointing to several thousand animals stolen by these quasi-governmental actors. Some elements of the VDP and the BIR have been denounced, re-assigned elsewhere or charged, but legal due process remains rare.

Mapping The Current Market

The above section highlights how cattle rustling has become increasingly entangled with broader instability, showing how violence and cattle rustling incidents increase and decrease together, as the main perpetrators of violence are the conflict parties. It demonstrates how security threats have shaped and been shaped by the stolen livestock market. Building on this, this section aims to map the current market, shifting the focus to the actors and dynamics beyond the initial thefts. It examines how stolen livestock is integrated into broader supply chains, how animals are laundered through markets and how different groups – including armed groups and livestock actors – profit from and sustain this illicit economy.

Actors in the supply chain

Armed group involvement in the cattle rustling market – JNIM, VDP and bandits – is primarily at the point of theft. However, a far broader set of ancillary networks underpins the subsequent transport and sale of the stolen livestock. Key actors can be understood to fall into the following categories: perpetrators, supporting networks and enablers.

Perpetrators

JNIM was the first large-scale perpetrator of cattle rustling in the tri-border area, particularly in Bounkani during 2020–2021, and in the Sud-Ouest in 2022–2023. The group systematically engaged in rustling as a revenue source, using the tri-border area as a transit zone for stolen cattle. They exerted control over rural communities by threatening rustling while imposing zakat on cattle owners for security guarantees. As of 2024, JNIM remained a significant player in this economy, but state-affiliated actors, notably the VDP, had become the main rustlers in the Sud-Ouest and Bounkani. Additionally, bandits and criminal groups have become prominent, especially in Upper West Ghana and along the Ivorian–Ghanaian border, operating either in cooperation with or independently from JNIM.

In the first three months of 2024, our data suggests that they have been reportedly involved in the rustling of up to 500 heads of cattle. While comprehensive data on looting by the VDP or the FDS is not available, dozens of testimonies of herders were collected, pointing to several thousand animals stolen by these quasi-governmental actors. Some elements of the VDP and the BIR have been denounced, re-assigned elsewhere or charged, but legal due process remains rare

Supporting networks

Young herders

The first actors in the chain, often the closest to the perpetrators, particularly JNIM, are young herders (bouviers, in French) tending to livestock for various cattle owners. JNIM has approached and sometimes recruited young herders in Mali, Burkina Faso and northern Côte d’Ivoire. These herders provide crucial intelligence to JNIM, including information on herd locations, optimal times for theft and the movements of security forces. These young herders are one of the most vulnerable links in the supply chain, and in particular to JNIM’s narratives, because they are often marginalized, living a hard life in the bush. They receive a small salary (typically around CFA30 000, or approximately €45, in Bounkani) and often lack prospects of a better livelihood. These herders are sometimes made to pay for any damage caused by the herd (to a farmer’s field for example). Such economic pressures can lead them to work with JNIM. The bouviers can also be a critical conduit between the armed group and cattle owners. One reported infiltration tactic by JNIM is to recruit young cattle herders and then send them to work for cattle owners, later enabling theft or extortion from the owner. This tactic is widely reported in northern Côte d’Ivoire, but has also been reported in other Sahelian-bordering regions of coastal states, including Kedougou region in Senegal. In Ghana, no such reports of JNIM recruiting and planting young herders among cattle owners came up during data collection, but media have reported that JNIM does recruit young herders in cattle markets in the Upper West.

Cattle traders

The second key actors in the supply chain are the cattle traders, who can be divided into local agents and larger regional agents. Local cattle traders operate within their immediate areas, within Upper West or Bounkani, often straddling the licit and illicit markets. Their experience in the livestock economy and established relationships with key players including larger livestock traders and transporters – enable them to efficiently negotiate and facilitate the movement and sale of stolen cattle. Local agents travel to the rural areas and forested zones, negotiating with key perpetrators (whether VDP, JNIM or bandits) and arranging for transport. They may sell these animals to larger traders that operate regionally and nationally in Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire. Alternatively, the local traders may directly transport the stolen animals to large intermediary markets for sale (in Bouaké and Banda Nkwanta, for example), where the local trade feeds into major urban consumption markets further south). Larger cattle traders operate either across regions or nationally. They operate in both the licit and illicit markets, and will typically buy from the local agents, but may also buy directly from rustlers.

A small number of traders based around Hamile reportedly travel into Burkina Faso to engage directly with JNIM. While not all big traders cooperate with the perpetrators, most are aware that the animals they handle are likely to be stolen. Stolen animals are attractive because they are priced below their licit market value. Big traders will sometimes transport stolen animals alongside ones purchased in rural markets, filling trucks with up to 60 animals, before selling them to large markets in the centre or south of Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana. From mid 2024 onwards, small and larger cattle traders struggled to link up with rustlers, especially JNIM, because of the region’s insecurity and increased pressure from the VDP against JNIM and anyone associated with them, including their traders. The VDP have, to some extent, replaced them.

They diversified into dual actors within the cattle rustling supply chain: from being rustlers only to also operating as local agents. Since mid-2024, some VDP members have allegedly collaborated with rustlers, including JNIM, by buying livestock from them at extremely low prices, and then reselling the animals to butchers and traders across the Burkina Faso–Côte d’Ivoire–Ghana corridor. These activities have been facilitated by the VDP’s continued freedom of movement between rural and urban zones, as well as across national borders. A similar dynamic developed further east, at the tri-border area between Burkina Faso, Ghana and Togo, as early as 2023, and is even more entrenched there. In response, the Burkinabe government has taken a number of measures since mid-2024, including the arrest or abduction of several cattle merchants working with VDP or with JNIM, as well as conducting investigations of suspected rogue VDP members.

Transporters

The third category of actors are transporters. They are typically truck or trailer drivers who are largely active in both the licit and illicit sectors. They are contacted by the traders (either local or regional) and typically do not directly interact with the perpetrators. However, they may be aware that their cargoes are stolen, or have suspicious origins, especially when they are called to move stolen cattle from remote locations (including informal assembly points) to markets for sale – an assignment that should in itself raise red flags. Loading is often done at odd hours – another clear indication of stolen stock. However, when stolen livestock have already been laundered through a local or regional market, and transporters move them on to further markets, they are unlikely to know the origin of the animals.

Big traders will sometimes transport stolen animals alongside ones purchased in rural markets, filling trucks with up to 60 animals, before selling them to large markets in the centre or south of Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana. From mid 2024 onwards, small and larger cattle traders struggled to link up with rustlers, especially JNIM, because of the region’s insecurity and increased pressure from the VDP against JNIM and anyone associated with them, including their traders. The VDP have, to some extent, replaced them

Butchers

Butchers are key actors in the stolen cattle economy across the tri-border region, even though they can typically handle about five to 10 animals at a time, meaning only a minority of stolen animals move through local butchers. Their role in the illicit trade is well illustrated by the example of the locality of Piaye in Bounkani region, where five butchers serve a tiny village. These butchers use an illegal slaughter area on the outskirts of Piaye and supply markets in the area, particularly gold-mining sites in bordering areas between Bounkani and Upper West. Community members have reported that the butchers are always extremely busy, even though the herder communities surrounding Piaye do not sell them livestock. These butchers are reportedly in direct contact with bandits operating along the border, but there were no links found between them and the VDP or JNIM. As in the case of Piaye, some butchers buy directly from perpetrators, be they armed groups, bandits or criminal networks. Others purchase stolen animals through a trader. Regardless, they would typically be aware that the animals are stolen because of the identities and reputation of the sellers, the unusual location of the sales, the urgency communicated and the below-market prices charged.

Enablers

These are actors who facilitate the passage of stolen cattle through the value chain, knowingly or unknowingly, but without direct contact with rustlers. Colluding traditional chiefs or community leaders often intervene in cases of cattle rustling where arrests have been made, by seeking to prevent criminal prosecution and pushing for amicable settlements. This is often achieved through intimidation, such as threats of banishment or expropriation, to coerce the victim into dropping the charges. Two community leaders in particular, in villages between Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana, are widely reported to protect local thieves, allegedly using their influence, and even bribery, to persuade security forces to abandon prosecutions. In return, they are said to receive some of the stolen cattle. Such cases were not described in Ghana, though traditional chiefs there do also resolve cattle-rustling cases in their territory, as reported in Côte d’Ivoire. For example, one herder recounted the following, echoing reports from other stakeholders in Bounkani region: The gendarmes from [one town] and the king of [another town] are openly working with the thieves. Just this year, some of our herder brothers caught four thieves.

They were on the border with Ghana. They had already sold the stolen livestock when the herders caught them. The herders arrested them and even took photos of the young thieves with their cellphones, which they handed over to the gendarmes, who went to catch the thieves. The herders thought that by handing the thieves over to the gendarmes, the latter would take them to [the town]. Later, they learned that the thieves had been freed by the gendarmes, after intervention by the king, because each thief had handed over the sum of CFA300 000 to the gendarmes. Other enablers include state veterinary services (attached to the Ministère des Ressources Animales et Halieutiques in Côte d’Ivoire and the Ministry of Food and Agriculture in Ghana). Local representatives of both ministries are responsible for checking the health of animals and issuing a permit for them to be moved from a given district or department. Intermediaries were reportedly able to obtain these official permits for the transport of stolen animals, both in Ghana and in Côte d’Ivoire.

The cattle laundromat: the pivotal role of Upper West and Bounkani In the tri-border area’s stolen livestock ecosystem, Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana operate most importantly as laundering areas for animals stolen in Burkina Faso, within the Sud-Ouest and beyond. As of April 2025, Ghana is the most important laundering zone by volume for stolen animals from Burkina Faso and Côte d’Ivoire. Moving stolen animals across borders obstructs traceability and is

therefore a favoured modus operandi for thieves. When no border has been crossed, another key tactic used is to hide the stolen animals for a period. This was reported in all three regions of the tri-border area. Once perpetrators have stolen the animals, they themselves or their intermediaries drive them into forested areas; the Comoé National Park in Côte d’Ivoire, the Dida or Koulbi forests in Burkina Faso, or any forested areas where they can freely move. There, the animals are hidden and the herds divided, and sometimes also mixed with other herds stolen in other incidents. Temporary mobile pens are used to manage the herds during these periods. During the following days, weeks or months, the animals are removed from the forest and sold slowly by the three main ways described below.

Informal black markets

Informal black markets – where all animals are stolen and no licit trade is conducted are the primary laundering hubs in Upper West Ghana. There is typically no permanent infrastructure in such markets, which usually consists of a cluster of large trucks waiting to move purchased animals, which is why they are also described as ‘loading docks’. While such markets were also used in Bounkani until 2022, the increased presence of state security in the region and initiatives by livestock actors to crack down on these have made them less common, although some continue to pop up in various localities and launder a small volume of animals. In the Upper West, towns operating as key informal black markets typically share common characteristics that facilitate the smuggling and laundering of stolen cattle: they are close to the border (often along the banks of the Volta River), remote, with limited security presence, and they often host significant cattle-rearing operations.

Black markets appear and reappear unpredictably in various places, a tactic that reduces the risk of detection. But as of late 2024, Fielmon, a border town, was described as among the most active black markets within the Upper West. As one security official explained: ‘Fielmon is a very serious black market. Hundreds of cattle are sold and bought in Fielmon week in and week out, but there is no established market there … This town is also noted for arms proliferation and various smuggling activities including fuel and fertilizer.’ Ghanaian regional cattle dealers are called by intermediaries to informal black markets, where they buy and transport stolen animals for onward sale. The vast majority of the animals sold at black markets are typically sent to larger markets in the centre and south of Ghana, such as Techiman, Kumasi and Accra. Smaller numbers may be resold in official markets in the Upper West, such as Wa.

Once perpetrators have stolen the animals, they themselves or their intermediaries drive them into forested areas; the Comoé National Park in Côte d’Ivoire, the Dida or Koulbi forests in Burkina Faso, or any forested areas where they can freely move. There, the animals are hidden and the herds divided, and sometimes also mixed with other herds stolen in other incidents. Temporary mobile pens are used to manage the herds during these periods

Large numbers of stolen animals do not end up in cattle markets in the Upper West, as explained by a cattle market official: ‘… [T]hose who sell here are genuine cattle owners, and sometimes a few petty thieves. But big rustlers do not bring their cattle here because the numbers will raise suspicions. They take them to the south where the numbers are many thousands so that even if you send two truckloads of cattle at a time, it is normal due to the size of the market.’ Banda Nkwanta market, in the neighbouring Savannah region, near the border with Côte d’Ivoire, stands out as a key laundering hub in the northern areas. It is the biggest market close to the Upper West – it can transact over a thousand cattle during a market day – and is well connected to smaller markets of the Upper West.

Laundering in official regional markets

Stolen livestock is also laundered through official regional markets, concealed among legitimate livestock trades. While both Bounkani and the Upper West have regional cattle markets, those of the former are Once the cattle is laundered in Doropo or Bouna markets, it is either resold in the region or transported further south to major centres such as Bouaké, Abidjan, Yamoussoukro or San Pedro.

Meat on the street: the role of butchers

The vast majority of stolen animals will end up either being sold in informal black markets or regional markets and then resold further south. However, a smaller flow of stock is sold directly to butchers in Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire. This takes place with smaller consignments than the previous two methods around five or six animals at a time. Butchers buy and quickly slaughter the animals to supply local demand, especially around artisanal gold-mining sites, where workforces are significant and demand is high. Multiple sources have warned not to underestimate this phenomenon. Thanks to the hiding method described above, entire herds can be laundered through this route. In the words of a herder from Doropo: ‘When a large number of cattle are stolen, they are temporarily hidden in the forests or the bush before being sold to the gold mining sites of Tanda, Bondoukou, or towards Galgouli, Boudara, Nansar or Kossami.’

Tracing the value chain: who benefits?

Profits shape interests, and tracing where the profits accumulate reveals how various actors’ financial interests are aligned in the new structure of the cattle trade. Armed groups now play a key role at the start of the value chain. The price of stolen livestock is consistently below that of livestock on the official market, sometimes as low as half the licit price. The faster the seller needs to get rid of the animals, the cheaper the price. Consequently, actors in the value chain who benefit from this price gap pocket the biggest profits. Crucially, most of the profits accrue not at the point of theft – where armed groups predominantly operate – but at the point of laundering, to mostly small or large traders much bigger and are better connected to Burkina Faso, and as such play a more prominent role. The markets of Doropo and Bouna, the two official cattle-trading centres in Bounkani, were repeatedly cited as laundering hubs, particularly by stakeholders in the Sud-Oest.

Doropo is the most vulnerable to laundering activities due to its proximity to the border, to the provenance of the cattle sold there over 90 per cent are from Burkina Faso – and to its size, with an average of 2 400 heads of cattle per month. While still secondary, Bouna market is increasingly vulnerable, as insecurity at the border with Burkina Faso since 2023 has displaced a significant proportion of trade away from Doropo to Bouna. Indeed, Bouna cattle market used to see on average 400 heads of cattle sold every month in 2019, and is up to more than 2 000 per month in 2024. Some negotiations between JNIM and Ghanaian or Ivorian traders might take place where animals are hidden, but they usually take place between JNIM-linked agents and their Ghanaian or Ivorian counterparts. These transactions take place either in JNIM-controlled forests or, if trust is established, in Ghana: in suitable forested areas, or at informal black markets or assembly points. Sources have reported that JNIM does not try to bargain, and typically agrees a price for the entire herd, rather than per animal, resulting in very low prices, on the lower end of the range in the figure above.

Financial flows: tracing profits

The tri-border area’s porous borders and informal trade networks deeply embedded in border communities serve to facilitate both legal and illegal cross-border financial flows. There were three main channels for financial flows linked to the cattle-rustling market: cash, Hawala transfers and mobile banking. A much smaller flow relates to cattle traders exchanging cattle for resources such as fuel, food or motorcycles, but these cases remain anecdotal and are not a widespread practice. Between Burkina Faso and Côte d’Ivoire, and between Burkina Faso and Ghana, the vast majority of cattle transactions, whether on the licit or the black markets, are paid in cash. As the cattle trade is a capital-intensive business, carrying large sums of cash is not unusual, and does not constitute a red flag. Where JNIM is the perpetrator, and sales are conducted in forested areas either in Burkina Faso or on the border, the sale and payment are typically made in two distinct phases. First, the price is agreed and the herd is taken by the agent, who will sell the herd in the following days or weeks. When the sale is done, a second meeting between JNIM and the agent takes place, in which the local agent pays JNIM with cash, denominated in CFA. This demonstrates a typically high degree of trust between JNIM and the agent. Another method consists of using money changers across the border, to avoid carrying cash, a process often referred to as Hawala. These transactions are very common, and are reportedly the prevalent payment method across the Ghana–Côte d’Ivoire border for cattle mostly sold in Bolé and Banda N’kwanta cattle markets.

Here the illicit cattle ecosystem is largely disconnected from conflict parties (JNIM or VDP), and is instead supplied by bandits operating on both sides of the border. Cattle dealers who want to move money across the border without carrying cash work with money changers. Money changers (mostly Ivorians) come into Ghana while working with partners in Côte d’Ivoire. The cattle dealer will give cedis to the money changer, and both will confirm and communicate with the money changer’s agent across the border in Côte d’Ivoire, from whom the Ghanaian cattle dealer, now in Côte d’Ivoire, will receive the CFA equivalent of the cedis he deposited with the money changer in Ghana. For conflict-linked cattle rustling, the cross-border town of Hamile on the border between Burkina Faso and Ghana stood out as a hub where licit and illicit cattle flows – and resulting financial flows are particularly high, with payments often made on mobile money platforms.

Mobile money service providers in Hamile have reported unusually large transfers ranging from 150 000 to 300 000 Ghanaian cedis (€9 237 to €18 475), a trend that has increased since late 2023. Large-scale transactions typically exchange cedi for CFA, indicating financial flows from Ghana into Burkina Faso or Côte d’Ivoire. While some of these transactions are likely legitimate, many are believed to be linked to the illicit trade. The unusual size of transactions, and the consistent cedi–CFA exchange, were both perceived to be indicators of illicit deals. The role of mobile money in facilitating informal trade should not be underestimated. It provides essential liquidity to small traders, enables efficient cross-border transactions, and fosters economic resilience. However, it also creates opportunities for criminality such as cattle rustling. Many mobile money agents and informal currency exchangers in Hamile either unknowingly engage in these transactions due to economic necessity or are complicit in the process. These findings align with broader studies on West African economies, which identify informal trade networks as critical channels for laundering the proceeds of illegal activities.

IMPACTS ON COMMUNITY RESILIENCE

Ongoing insecurity and cattle rustling have negatively impacted the resilience of communities in the tri-border area, especially in Sud-Ouest and Bounkani regions, creating myriad entry points for JNIM, which has repeatedly proven adept at exploiting them. Herders have lost entire herds overnight, losing their livelihoods in a single incident. Many also lose family members, as cattle rustling becomes increasingly violent. Herders in the Sud-Ouest have also been displaced from rural areas to cities, and struggled to recover an income. Others have sold their herds as the risk of losing it to cattle rustlers was too high. 104 The loss of licit livelihoods makes individuals vulnerable to VEO recruitment or to engagement in illicit activities. Cattle rustling has also undermined the relationship between communities and the state.This is most drastic in the Sud-Ouest, where the VDP have become one of the main perpetrators. As one herder in the Sud-Oest said: ‘I’ve lost my animals. These thefts are carried out by the VDP themselves, who are supposed to protect us. How can we trust them?’ In Bounkani, communities affected by rustling often perceived authorities as either corrupt or ineffective.

When the sale is done, a second meeting between JNIM and the agent takes place, in which the local agent pays JNIM with cash, denominated in CFA. This demonstrates a typically high degree of trust between JNIM and the agent. Another method consists of using money changers across the border, to avoid carrying cash, a process often referred to as Hawala. These transactions are very common, and are reportedly the prevalent payment method across the Ghana–Côte d’Ivoire border for cattle mostly sold in Bolé and Banda N’kwanta cattle markets

Herders typically relied on their own networks and resources to try to recover stolen livestock, because authorities were perceived as unable or unwilling to help. JNIM is skilled at exploiting this disillusionment to recruit collaborators. The Development and Resilience Index against Violent Extremism (DRIVE), designed by EAI/R4P and implemented across northern Côte d’Ivoire, including Bounkani, reveals that pathways to recruitment by VEOs include the exploitation of socio-economic grievances to gain local support and the erosion of the legitimacy of state institutions. Perceived failures in fighting cattle rustling are a clear driver of diminished state legitimacy. For example, the Gogo subprefecture in Bounkani was among the most affected by cattle rustling in 2020 and 2021, and again in 2024. Gogo also stands out for the low levels of trust in the state and a resulting refusal to use government services. Gogo and the Tehini department are especially vulnerable to the influence of VEOs because of the lack of economic and community resilience.

The rustling economy also exacerbates intracommunal tensions across the tri-border area, particularly spurring anti-Fulani sentiment. Ethnically framed state or community responses – not only to rustling incidents – enable intracommunal tensions to flourish. Communities in the area tend to discriminate against the Fulani community, and in Sud-Ouest anti-Fulani feeling is most developed, with security and defence forces targeting Fulani communities in large-scale extrajudicial killings, arbitrary arrests and cattle rustling. This is also true for Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire. According to DRIVE, 37 per cent of communities in Bounkani think that ‘all Fulanis are allied with jihadists’. This leaves Fulanis trapped between violent extremist groups and the security and defence forces, a position grimly echoed throughout the Sahel. Many have decided to flee from the Sud-Ouest to northern Côte d’Ivoire and northern Ghana. Cohabitation there has been difficult, with mutual resentment growing between these communities. According to DRIVE, 42 per cent of the host communities attributed the increase in insecurity, banditry and cattle rustling to Fulani asylum seekers largely without evidence which reflects data collected in October 2024 for this report.

RESPONSES

State responses

In Burkina Faso, responses remain focused on counterterrorism rather than on addressing cattle rustling per se. These efforts have paradoxically strengthened the role of a new actor, the VDP, in cattle rustling, impacting Burkina Faso and northern Côte d’Ivoire as the VDP operate on both sides of the border. Meanwhile, Côte d’Ivoire has combined security measures targeting JNIM to secure the border and control the movement of animals and herds (though in practice it is only partially implemented), and to foster community resilience. These have yielded positive impacts, although significant cattle laundering continues to happen in the markets of Bouna and Doropo. Ivorian state responses are further undermined by strained political relations with Burkina Faso. State responses to specific instances of rustling in the tri-border area were broadly perceived by communities to be limited. Where a link with JNIM was reported, especially in Côte d’Ivoire, the cases seemed to be generally taken more seriously, as the authorities are aware of the finances that cattle rustling brings to armed groups. It was not possible to establish if and how these cases were solved. The limited effect of reporting cases also results in significant under-reporting.

One herder in Côte d’Ivoire was representative of other testimonies heard in the tri-border area: Pursuing cases [taking legal action for cattle theft] often ends up backfiring on the owner of the lost livestock. Often, when we talk about costs, administrative procedures and so on, you go back and forth… We found that all of this is just a waste of time. We don’t like pursuing cases. It’s also

for protection. Because if someone gets arrested and put in prison because of you … that exposes you even more, since most of these thieves today operate in networks… and we often work in the bush. Very often, you’re alone at night, on your motorcycle, going to watch over your animals … It’s all these things that we consider, so we just decide to let it go.

Community responses 

The perceived inadequacy of state responses to livestock theft has led to a range of community initiatives. These initiatives often emerge independently or in collaboration with international partners and focus primarily on three key areas: preventing thefts, facilitating the tracing and recovery once the theft has happened, and making it more challenging to launder stolen cattle through markets in Bounkani and Upper West regions. To prevent theft, communities have built cattle ‘parks’ within plots or on the outskirts of villages to prevent animals from wandering, especially at night. These enclosures enable better monitoring of cattle, thereby reducing the risk of theft. Other strategies include restricting the number of animals allowed to graze together (if they graze at all) and increasing the number of herdsmen responsible for overseeing them, which can diminish opportunities for large-scale rustling. When rustling incidents do occur, communities have implemented various initiatives to locate and recover the stolen livestock. In the Sud-Ouest, herders have expressed their helplessness because even if they manage to locate their herd, they cannot recover it from armed actors, be they JNIM or the VDP. But the overall situation in the tri-border area remains somewhat less extreme than in conflict hotspots elsewhere in the Sahel.

Ivorian state responses are further undermined by strained political relations with Burkina Faso. State responses to specific instances of rustling in the tri-border area were broadly perceived by communities to be limited. Where a link with JNIM was reported, especially in Côte d’Ivoire, the cases seemed to be generally taken more seriously, as the authorities are aware of the finances that cattle rustling brings to armed groups

There remains some room for recovering stolen animals. The herder community is relatively well organized and networked, allowing them to rely on one another for assistance in recovering stolen animals. Numerous herders’ testimonies indicate that stolen cattle have been retrieved through the use of social media (WhatsApp groups in particular) or through the vigilance of communities in different villages that will alert their ruga (the head of a Fulani community), or other herders or traders if they see animals wandering. This system works mostly locally, or across borders when communities on both sides are well connected. That said, rustlers and intermediaries know these community methods, and to evade capture they often move stolen cattle quickly away from border regions or conceal them in forested areas. Tracking stolen animals once they have crossed international borders is critical.

Various initiatives in the Sahel and the tri-border area are addressing this issue.117 While there have been attempts to connect herders and local market systems across borders, these efforts so far have yielded limited outcomes, with herders and local authorities still perceiving the borders as a critical vulnerability. One herder from Bounkani aptly captured this sentiment: ‘We search for our animals immediately. If they end up in Doropo or Bouna, we will find them. If they hide in the forests, maybe we will find some. If they cross the border, it is over.’ Local initiatives also exist, such as when traditional authorities from border communities in Upper West and Sud-Ouest convened in October 2024 to establish a ‘right of pursuit.’ This agreement allows authorities from both countries to collaborate more effectively in tracking down thieves who operate across borders. However, a significant limitation of this mechanism is its exclusivity; it only involves traditional authorities without the inclusion of communities or administrative bodies. To deter the sale of stolen cattle in official markets, management committees in the Upper West and Bounkani regions have introduced various safeguards that stakeholders perceive as (at least partially) effective.

These measures are mostly about limiting the number of cattle markets and the number of cattle traders allowed to sell in each market. The idea behind it being that centralization fosters stronger control over livestock transactions. In Bounkani, for instance, safeguards have reinforced an older system where sales occur through intermediaries called teiffas. Under this system, all sellers must work with a teiffa, who acts as a guarantor for the sale. The teiffa is responsible for ensuring that the cattle sold come from legitimate sources as claimed by the seller. If there are doubts, the teiffa must conduct an investigation to determine their true origins. This traditional system adds a layer of scrutiny to the trade, routing it through trusted and accountable intermediaries. Moreover, the requirement for sellers or owners to be present at the market alongside their teiffa fosters transparency, preventing dubious actors from conducting transactions unnoticed.