Author: Adelino Handem
Site of the publication: ASSN
Type of the publication: Article
Date of the publication: March 2023
Introduction
Since the country’s total liberation from Portuguese colonial rule in 1974, Guinea-Bissau has undergone several security and defence sector reform processes led by succeeding governments, with support from international partners. Despite positive developments, the country still has a pressing need to stabilize and consolidate the sector’s institutions. The weak participation of citizens in general, and communities, in security dialogue and recurrent politico-military conflicts, have not fostered democratic governance of the defence and security sector.
Indeed, the country has experienced several political-military conflicts since independence, including coups d’état, some of which culminated in the overthrow of four heads of state, as well as palace coups with strong military involvement that have reversed the constitutional order, keeping the country in chronic political and institutional instability. The intervention of militarized forces in national political life is evident, often resulting in the persecution of political activists, beatings, and assassinations.
Of the previous reform processes in the sector, we can point out that reforms within the Guinea-Bissau armed forces began in the mid-1970s, with the support of bilateral and multilateral partners. The first was dedicated to the demobilization and reintegration of combatants of the armed struggle for national liberation, supported through bilateral cooperation (the former Soviet Union, China, and Portugal). This was followed by others of a more reformist and modernizing nature under the framework of multilateral (UN, EU, AU), and bilateral (Portugal, Angola) cooperation.
Indeed, the country has experienced several political-military conflicts since independence, including coups d’état, some of which culminated in the overthrow of four heads of state, as well as palace coups with strong military involvement that have reversed the constitutional order, keeping the country in chronic political and institutional instability. The intervention of militarized forces in national political life is evident, often resulting in the persecution of political activists, beatings, and assassinations
These previous security and defense sector reform programmes experienced many administrative and political bottlenecks, sometimes due to the rigid procedures of international organizations, which lacked a clear strategy for national ownership. These programmes functioned as projects, each with very high levels of funding, almost all of which was consumed by international technical assistance, including infrastructure, vehicles, travel, etc.
The modernization of the security and defense forces is currently underway in the country and is being accompanied by ECOWAS, which has maintained a regional stabilization force in Bissau since the “failed coup attempt” in early 2022. It should be noted that many Bissau Guinean activists and political analysts consider the presence of foreign military forces in the national territory inappropriate and without legal backing, violating the principle of sovereignty and respect for local legislation.
Implementation of the SSRG in the ECOWAS political framework
Since the adoption of the ECOWAS policy framework in 2016 and its launch in November 2021, it was only during the Bissau workshop that many security sector actors became aware of this important ECOWAS policy instrument for member states. Little information was circulated about the state of implementation in Guinea-Bissau, especially towards non-state actors. Basically, only the military structures and some state departments have monitored implementation due to the lack of effective national coordination mechanisms.
In general, the programmes operate with external financial support, on a project basis, often obeying the strategies and operating rules of the funding institution, and with budget limitations.
The modernization of the security and defense forces is currently underway in the country and is being accompanied by ECOWAS, which has maintained a regional stabilization force in Bissau since the “failed coup attempt” in early 2022. It should be noted that many Bissau Guinean activists and political analysts consider the presence of foreign military forces in the national territory inappropriate and without legal backing, violating the principle of sovereignty and respect for local legislation
Despite the limited involvement of CSOs in the SSRG processes, they have been very active and proactive, particularly at times of political-institutional crises, in the mediation of community conflicts, and in defense of victims of violence of any kind, particularly through women’s and youth organizations.
Key areas and perspectives for the next phase of SSRG support and implementation
Management and coordination were identified as the weakest elements in the SSRG process in Guinea-Bissau. However, it is the consensus of the majority that they constitute the building blocks for ensuring good governance of the security sector and civilian oversight, namely by parliament and civil society organizations, in particular the integration of women and youth.
The issue of the Interministerial Commission for defense and Security Sector Reform (CIRSDS) being placed under the Prime Minister’s authority, considering the inoperativeness and inefficiency observed over the years, should be reviewed. The numerous responsibilities of the head of government, the lack of budgetary allocation, the weak representation of civil society, and the administrative bureaucracies end up making the operation of the CIRSDS unfeasible. A more autonomous structure and another type of more efficient supervision should be considered, such as the creation of a “High Commission for Reform and Governance of the Security Sector (ACSSRG) under the supervision of the ANP”.
Legislation and democratic control are two pillars of good governance in the defense and Security Sector. In Guinea-Bissau, many of the regional and international legislative packages to prevent and combat relevant crimes (drug trafficking, money laundering, piracy, cyber-crime, etc.) need to be domesticated and mainstreamed. Most notably, civilian control of the SSRG is practically non-existent, despite the existence of a parliamentary commission for defense and security in the ANP.