Introduction

Since October 2017, there has been a deadly, though under-reported, conflict between Cameroon’s military and separatist forces from the two anglophone North-West and South-West regions. Between 1919 and 1961, these two regions were under British colonial administration and were known as British Southern Cameroons. Following a UN plebiscite on 11 February 1961, inhabitants voted to ‘reunite’ with French Cameroun on 1 October 1961. Today, anglophone Cameroonians from these two regions constitute about one-fifth of the country’s estimated 28.5 million people.

The politicisation of anglophone Cameroon’s minority status and the violent abuses that it has suffered at the hands of Cameroon’s authoritarian state for more than 60 years are the key factors driving anglophone resentment and the separatist conflict. By recent estimates, the conflict has already led to over 3,000 deaths, internally displaced more than 750,000 people and left about 1.3 million people in need of humanitarian assistance. President Paul Biya, Cameroon’s reclusive leader since 1982, is fixated on pursuing a failed path of war against the separatist groups, whom he calls ‘terrorists’.

In September 2019, the government organised a ‘Major National Dialogue’ (MND) with much fanfare. However, (…) In January 2018, the government – conspiring with Nigerian authorities – abducted separatist movement leaders who were meeting in Abuja. They were extradited to Cameroon and held in secret for months. (…) Prime Minister Dion Ngute, an anglophone, travelled around the two regions asking local civil-society organisations, chiefs and other anglophone figures already tethered to the government to participate in the discussions, omitting the main figures in the separatist movement. Leading separatists were either not invited or declined to participate in the talks because of their fear of repression and the government’s insistence that there could be no discussion on the fundamental structure or form of the state.

(…) The MND also granted ‘a special status’ to the regional councils in the North- West and South-West regions. This decentralisation approach, including the conferring of special regional status, had been a measure adopted during the 1996 constitutional reforms. Incidentally, these were reforms that were conceded partly in response to an earlier phase of anglophone nationalism, between 1990 and 1995, but were deliberately not implemented for more than two decades. In addition, the MND resolved to ‘ensure the equality of English and French in all aspects of national life’ and President Biya established the National Commission for the Promotion of Bilingualism and Multiculturalism. Furthermore, the government has claimed success in its disarmament demobilisation and re-integration initiatives with some separatists. In reality, though, the (failed) dialogue and the demobilisation and reintegration initiatives often reported on national television seem like a state propaganda effort to undermine the separatist cause.

There is, therefore, no clear and credible agenda for negotiations as yet. So far, Biya has failed to even visit any areas affected by the conflict. In mid-2019, the Swiss government offered to mediate between the separatists and the Cameroonian government. Although the Swiss-mandated Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue initially had the support of both parties as mediator, the leadership of the separatist movement soon split over the neutrality of this institution and Biya’s longstanding ties with Switzerland as whole. At the moment, it is not clear whether any significant headway has been made towards a negotiated peace settlement.

Given this state of affairs, the crisis in the anglophone regions of Cameroon risks stagnating into another ‘frozen’ conflict, swinging between periods of relative calm and low-intensity violence, on the one hand, and periodic intensive attacks and counter-offensives between separatists and government troops, on the other. Civilians become progressively more vulnerable in a protracted conflict, as has been the case over the last four years. What is also clear, both within the country and also for those anglophone Cameroonians living abroad, is that anglophone grievances run deep and have remained unaddressed for a long time.

Anglophone grievances 

The separatists describe themselves as a movement for the ‘restoration’ of the ‘Republic of Ambazonia’. The name Ambazonia (…) was coined in the mid-1980s by an anglophone dissident lawyer, Fon Gorji Dinka. By the 1990s, anglophone elite activism had crystallised into deliberations called the All Anglophone Conferences in Buea (AAC I 1992) and Bamenda (AAC II 1993).

These yielded resolutions aimed at advancing anglophone interests in Cameroon. However, subsequent differences within the anglophone elite and the government’s dismissive response to many of the anglophone demands following the AACs prompted the establishment of a dissident, radical separatist movement – the Southern Cameroons National Council (SCNC) in 1995. Thus, there is a long, complex genealogy to anglophone nationalism, which fuels the current conflict. However, its immediate origins can be traced to the government’s violent repression of protests by the unions of anglophone lawyers and teachers in late 2016.

In October 2016, anglophone teachers’ and lawyers’ unions launched peaceful protests against the ‘neglect’ and ‘marginalisation’ of the two English-speaking regions. Large groups of people took part in the year-long protests, which focused specifically on the appointment of francophone teachers, prosecutors and judges in anglophone areas. The union leadership denounced these appointments as part of the government’s gradual but steady process of ‘francophonisation’ of a nominally bilingual (English and French) state, which had been in evidence since the reunification of British and French Cameroons in 1961. In the francophone regions, such as Douala and Yaoundé, which host large communities of anglophones, French is often the only language that can be used when accessing vital public services. Within both the public and private sectors, anglophones are easily recognised by their names and are then treated as second-class citizens with regards to employment, processing of official documents, and appointments. Anglophone Cameroonians have long complained about the almost total domination of public life by the francophone elite.

The 2016–2017 protests were brutally suppressed. Unarmed protesters were shot and killed by soldiers who inflicted cruel and inhumane treatment on other protesters who had been detained, including the union leadership and anglophone student activists. Government also imposed a 90-day internet shutdown in the two anglophone regions. In mid-December 2016, at the height of the turmoil, Joseph Wirba, an anglophone member of Cameroon’s National Assembly (parliament) from the North-West region, denounced (from the floor of parliament) the violent repression against ‘the people of West Cameroon’. Wirba was subsequently persecuted by government troops and fled initially to Nigeria and then to Europe. As Wirba highlighted, a main reason for anglophone calls for separation is their resentment of the authoritarian rule by the country’s mostly francophone leadership. Indeed, all Cameroonians have been the victims of this state-administered abuse, first under Ahmadou Ahidjo (1960–1982) and then under Paul Biya (from 1982 onwards).

Yet in the anglophone regions, security forces are unnerved and therefore particularly brutal when dealing with protests, fearing autonomist claims. Since 1990, protests (including student protests) in the anglophone regions have often been met with swift and deadly violence.

This repressive rule has left a terrible trail of human rights violations and executions of dissidents and protesters. Furthermore, the concentration of powers in the presidency means that parliament and the judiciary are not independent; they function as extensions of the executive. Parliament has not even formally discussed the conflict, almost four years on. These torrid conditions have bred widespread corruption and entrenched the appeal of ethnic politics among the ruling elite, particularly those within the orbit of Biya’s Beti/Bulu ethnic groups. The end result is that public services (including public health, education, and law and order) and public infrastructure (including electricity, roads and water) have been in a deplorable state since the mid-1980s.

Today the country is a ‘fragile state’, facing security and political crises that heighten the risk of political implosion. The second and most important cause of anglophone separatists’ grievances is what they claim to be the ‘coloniality’ of their union with the French Cameroon state. Anglophone nationalists question the UN-imposed plebiscite of 11 February 1961.

They argue that by compelling British Cameroonians to choose between Nigeria and French Cameroon as the route to their independence, the UN’s implementation of its own provisions for decolonisation in Article 76 (b) regarding former trust territories, was flawed. Carlson Anyangwe, a long-time anglophone-autonomy activist, describes this decolonisation process as a case of ‘annexation shrouded in subterfuge’ by French Cameroon with the complicity of France, Britain and the UN. Thus, Wirba’s comments echo the frequently expressed sentiment among anglophone Cameroonians that the francophone majority views and treats the two anglophone regions as a colonial appendage and not as a distinct and wholly equal part of Cameroon.

John Ngu Foncha was the prime minister of Southern Cameroon (1957–1961) who negotiated its reunification with French Cameroon in 1961. Later, however, Foncha was filled with regret about the union of the two Cameroons, particularly during the effervescent displays of anglophone nationalism in the 1990s. He famously wrote his letter of resignation from the ruling party (Cameroon People’s Democratic Movement) to Paul Biya in June 1990 in which he complained that ‘anglophone Cameroonians that I brought into this union are now viewed as “Biafrans” and “the enemies within the home”’.

The violent suppression of the anglophone protests in 2016–2017 (…). Firstly, unlike in the early 1990s when anglophone elites met for the AAC I and AAC II, the government’s repressive behaviour has made the mainstream or establishment anglophone elite fearful of being targeted, which has engendered a reluctance to speak out, like Wirba did. Secondly, the repression has further radicalised anglophone youth, while also creating a sense of solidarity and garnering support from anglophone Cameroonians in the diaspora.

Ultimately, anglophone Cameroonians who are sympathetic towards the separatist or autonomist cause have concluded that such autonomy would only be viable if driven by anglophone Cameroonian leaders who live and work outside Cameroon. As a leader associated with the Ambazonian Interim Government (IG) remarked to me recently: ‘For any separatist struggle to succeed [under this repression], the government has to be outside the country it is breaking away from. Otherwise, the leadership is always at risk of imprisonment or assassination.’

In sum, at the core of anglophone grievances is the call to change the state’s fundamental structure. On the one hand, to achieve peace while maintaining unity in the country, some autonomists advocate a ‘return’ to the initial 1961 agreement for a two-state federation. Whereas these federalists had been in the majority among anglophones before the start of the conflict, federalists are now a minority in today’s heated climate. In contrast, radical separatists are demanding outright and total independence as the only way for anglophone Cameroonians to free themselves from francophone domination and to avoid future crises. However, Biya and his government elite (including a small anglophone minority in government) refuse to enter into any discussions on changes to the fundamental form of the Cameroonian state, which would imply a loss of power for the central government in Yaoundé.

As mentioned, following the MND, the resolutions and a number of peremptory executive orders that Biya signed in late 2019 have failed to douse anglophone separatists’ strident calls for greater autonomy. (…) Many of these measures are viewed as “sham concessions” that are ‘too little, too late’ for the separatists.

The anglophone diaspora and the conflict 

Anglophone Cameroonians in the diaspora have been important players in the conflict in at least two ways. The protests embarked upon by anglophone Cameroonian communities in Africa (especially in Nigeria and South Africa), Australia, Europe and the US were particularly intense between September 2016 and December 2020.

Authorities in Yaoundé quickly recognised this mobilisation from the diaspora as a major challenge to their efforts to quell the protests in the anglophone regions. Government officials repeatedly stated that ‘those in the diaspora are the ones spearheading the war’, especially in Belgium, Canada, South Africa and the US. These protests from the diaspora have drawn the world’s attention to the conflict.

While the separatist ‘militias have become more autonomous’ in the last two years or so, they were ‘initially funded almost exclusively by the diaspora’. Particularly noteworthy were the fund-raising campaigns that were widely supported by individuals and groups from anglophone Cameroonian communities around the world. Many of these groups also provided materials to be used for humanitarian assistance for displaced communities, including those in refugee settlements in Nigeria.

President Biya has ignored national and international calls for, and efforts to encourage, dialogue and negotiations with the leaders of the anglophone separatist movement. Again, organisations led by members of the anglophone Cameroonian diaspora are turning up the volume in calling for international pressure to be placed on Yaoundé. For example, the Coalition for Dialogue and Negotiations (CDN), a group of English-speaking Cameroonian professionals in the diaspora (predominantly in the US), advocate a peaceful resolution to the conflict. With its ‘Let’s End the War’ campaign, the CDN is mobilising ‘international pressure for a ceasefire’ and an ‘international conference on the conflict’, considering that such discussions ‘cannot freely take place in Cameroon’.

In August 2020, Biya ordered delegations of government ministers to travel to consult with anglophone Cameroonians abroad. Several of these missions met with stiff resistance and were disrupted by anglophone secessionist activists. In response, the authorities in Cameroon have cracked down on anglophone Cameroonians working and living abroad who are suspected of sympathising with the Ambazonian separatist cause. Some have been arrested and imprisoned or deported from ports of entry in Cameroon.

In the wake of growing international pressure, the regime has searched for other strategies to combat the diaspora’s influence. On 17 February 2021, 61 members of Cameroon’s National Assembly wrote to the US Congress to complain about the role of the anglophone diaspora in the conflict.

The efforts of the Cameroonian authorities underline the seriousness with which the government views the contribution of the anglophone Cameroonian diaspora in the ongoing conflict. In contrast to the 1990s, the leadership of the current wave of anglophone nationalists, particularly those in the diaspora, is remarkably youthful. In addition to pursuing international litigation (…), the younger generation has been much more effective in exploiting new digital technologies to promote their cause. This has allowed them to establish a considerable presence in the media (especially online media), from a range of online news blogs (including Bareta News and National Telegraph) to audio-visual platforms (such as SCBC) and social media (…).

While Cameroonian authorities deploy their repressive machinery to suppress dissent or opposition at home, including arresting and detaining journalists and occasionally shutting down the internet, the anglophone Cameroonian diaspora cannot be readily affected by such repression. This digital media infrastructure has also given considerable influence and power to the anglophone separatists abroad in terms of shaping the narrative of the anglophone struggle in Cameroon.

Despite its successes so far in resisting the repression and violence, the anglophone Cameroonian separatist movement, including those in the diaspora, has become fragmented. The main causes of strife are differing views on the strategic direction of the movement, emerging rivalry among the different separatist forces and struggles for control over financial resources which come from donations. Ultimately, these divisions could prove to be too deep. Already, there is growing uncertainty about the leadership and ability of the separatist movement to negotiate with the Cameroonian authorities in such volatile circumstances.